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INTRODUCTION

While some of the divergent aspects of employment practices in union and
non-union workplaces have diminished in recent years, one of the more
conspicuous and enduring distinctions relates to the constraints under which
employers operate when terminating employees. For employers with a
unionized workforce, contract duties as set forth in a collective bargaining
agreement are, of course, central to decisionmaking. On the other hand, apart
from statutory restrictions, non-union employers have customarily made
decisions regarding employment terminations in accordance with self-enforcing
norms.' While some exceptions to the employment-at-will rule have arisen in
the last couple of decades, non-union employers still enjoy considerably more
discretion with personnel decisions than do union employers. Employment
arbitration, if widely adopted, could result in a convergence of union and nonunion employment practices.
Many employers of non-union employees are indeed embracing arbitration
to resolve workplace disputes. 2 This growing use of arbitration is a significant
1. One knowledgeable of the intricate regulation of the workplace might scoff at the
notion that non-union employers are guided by "self-enforcing norms" rather than the law. The
statement relates only to the termination of at-will employees, which has itself become rather
complicated in recentyears. Fora discussion ofrecentdevelopments in employment-at-will law,
see infra Part II.B.
2. See R. Bales, A NewDirectionforAmericanLaborLaw: IndividualAutonomy and
the Compulsory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights, 30 Hous. L. REV. 1863, 1912
(1994); Tia Schneider Denenberg & R.V. Denenberg, The Future of the Workplace Dispute
Resolver, Disp. REsOL. J., June 1994, at 48, 48-49; David Lewin, GrievanceProceduresin
Nonunion Workplaces: An EmpiricalAnalysis of Usage, Dynamics, and Outcomes, 66 CHI.KENTL. REV. 823,824 (1990); Evan J. Spelfogel, Legal andPracticalImplications ofADR and
Arbitration in Employment Disputes, 11 HoFsTRA LAB. L.J. 247, 269 (1993) (noting American
Arbitration Association survey results); Leslie Kaufman & Anne Underwood, Sign or Hit the
Street,NEWSWEEK, June 30, 1997, at 48. The adoption of arbitration by employers ofnon-union
employees is in part related to a more general infatuation with ADR processes. In this regard,
commentators have noted that:
The 1980s-a decade which will undoubtedly be remembered as a decade
of great transitions-witnessed the serious development of the Alternative
Dispute Resolution (ADR) movement. A host of reasons, including
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development for two reasons. First, it signals the end of an era. Traditionally,
non-union meant "non-legal"-a situation that more often than not was
beneficial to employers, but in some aspects was advantageous to employees
as well. While a variety of reasons might motivate employers to adopt
arbitration, one of the most influential is a perception that the law has invaded
and even overwhelmed the workplace; in other words, the fact that employers
are ceding authority to third parties indicates a belief that the status quo
involves an even greater risk, because non-union no longer means non-legal.3
Thus, on one level, adopting arbitration merely acknowledges afaitaccompli,
an acquiescence to the reality of a law-centered workplace. Second, by
establishing arbitration as a common method of dispute resolution, employers
are laying the groundwork for further change of a profound nature. The process
would have a minimal impact on the substantive nature of employer duties and
employee rights if it involved only statutory claims; but it will encompass more
than that. Over time, employment arbitration will act as a magnet for an
assortment of legal theories. The recognition of these claims, and the
articulation of the theories supporting the claims in arbitration decisions, will
lead to the functional equivalent of detailed contracts. Moreover, while the
recognition of certain substantive rights of employees will be the more obvious
result of this development, changes to the present state of affairs regarding
procedural obligations should also be momentous.
Part II of this Article analyzes certain attributes of the non-union
employment relationship by developing a picture of the traditionally governed
non-union workplace and showing the effect of recent legal developments. Part
III explains how certain factors inherent to the arbitration process and the
employment relationship create a receptive climate for the emergence of
contract. Part III begins by describing the employment arbitration process,
including a discussion of its parallels to labor arbitration, and considers the

congested court dockets, a search for a "warmer way of disputing," and a
desire for increased party participation or use of community values,
contributed to the ever increasing popularity and advocacy of Alternative
Dispute Resolution.
Susan A. Fitzgibbon, The JudicialItch,34 ST. LouISU. L.J. 485,485 (1990) (footnotes omitted);
see also S. Gale Dick, ADR at the Crossroads,DisP. RESOL. J., Mar. 1994, at 47, 47 (analyzing
the general growth trend of ADR).
3. Arbitration is, of course, a form ofalternative dispute resolution. In the context of
this Article, it should be emphasized that arbitration must ultimately be evaluated by comparison
to full-scale litigation in the courts, and not to the informal mechanisms of dealing with
workplace conflict, which tend to be the norm in non-union establishments. While this pointmay
be somewhat elementary to some, it is noteworthy because others may consider it counterintuitive. For example, employers may be inclined to consider the introduction of arbitration in
a non-union environment as a dramatic innovation which obviously gives employees
substantially more rights than they previously enjoyed. However, with such an appraisal,
employers may overlook, or at least underestimate, the external pressures to provide a process
which in some important ways mirrors the legal system that they hoped to avoid. The point is
that arbitration will make the workplace more law-centered despite the absence of courtrooms.
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peculiar challenge that employment arbitrators will face in contract disputes
relating to agreements that are, at best, incomplete in their coverage. Part III
also discusses the "highly relational" aspects of employment. Finally, Part IV
outlines the manner in which both procedural and substantive rights for nonunion employees could eventually emerge as a result of disputes being resolved
in the arbitration forum. The ultimate conclusion is that a variety of influences
will lead to the establishment of a de facto contract with something akin to
"minimum standards" for employers that utilize arbitration.4
A word regarding the fact that this Article principally addresses disputes
relating to wrongful discharge is in order. Managing a workforce involves
decisionmaking across a wide spectrum of issues, including such matters as
scheduling overtime, disciplining employees, assigning work, selecting
personnel for layoffs in workforce reductions, designing compensation
packages, and transferring employees. Comprehensive restrictions on employer
discretion in the collective bargaining agreement permit unions to challenge
decisions in these and many other areas. A non-union employer might also
voluntarily allow employees to contest its decisions on many of these issues by
agreeing to submit disputes to arbitration. Nonetheless, this Article focuses
upon employee dismissals. Although employment arbitrators may consider
other types of disputes on a fairly regular basis (a prime example being the
imposition of severe disciplinary sanctions short of discharge), the most critical
area of development will relate to wrongful discharge, at least for the first
generation of employment arbitration cases. Moreover, many of the points
made in this Article relating to employee dismissals generally apply to other
types of grievances.
II. THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP IN THE NON-UNION WORKPLACE
Why are employers turning to arbitration now? And why did they not
begin to pursue this option twenty-five or even ten years ago? Two factors
explain the current attitude toward arbitration. One is the tremendous expansion
of individual rights for non-union employees. The other is the Supreme Court's
deference to the arbitration of statutory claims, most notably in its decision in

4. The following article deserves mention at this point: Stephen L. Hayford &
Michael J. Evers, The InteractionBetween the Employment-At-Will Doctrine and EmployerEmployee Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory FairEmployment Practices Claims: Difficult
ChoicesforAt-Will Employers, 73 N.C. L. REv. 443 (1995). Although Hayford and Evers have
a different focus, the central thesis of their article has close parallels to this Article. Most
importantly, they predict that if non-union employers submit fair employment practice disputes
to arbitration, a de facto contract could emerge which would embrace a wide range of
employment practices. As will become clear, this Article is similar in some regards (for example,
it is asserted that a "de facto contract" will likely emerge), but it focuses on different reasons for
the emergence of a contract. Nonetheless, both Hayford and Evers warrant credit for their initial
treatment of this topic, which the author acknowledges.
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Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.5 This Part begins with a description
of employee relations in the traditional workplace and then discusses
subsequent developments that have fundamentally changed the non-union
employer-employee relationship. The Supreme Court's deference to arbitration
is discussed later in the Article.'
A. The TraditionalWorkplace: Employee Relations in the Shadow ofthe
Law

The law played a decidedly unobtrusive role in the traditional workplace!
To the extent that the law determined disputes relating to employee dismissals,
the resolution was relatively simple and, for the most part, one-sided in favor
of employers. But employee relations in a traditional workplace are much more
complex than the legal rules alone might indicate. Other significant, non-legal
restrictions on the exercise of employer discretion exist in the shadow of the
law.8 The purely legal constraints will be discussed first.
Considering the law of commerce and trade from a historical perspective,
Lawrence Friedman has noted that, "Contract as a branch of law can best be
called residual; it dealt with those areas of business life not otherwise regulated.
Its cardinal principle was permissive: agreements should be given whatever
effect parties meant them to have."9 Prior to New Deal legislation, scarcely any
governmental regulation of the employment relationship existed. ' In this
context, the principle of permissiveness meant that the balance of economic
power shaped the employment relationship. In theory, employers and
employees had the opportunity to negotiate terms that provided employees with
significant protections against being fired for malicious or arbitrary reasons.
Given this framework, the employment-at-will doctrine was extremely
important because it established the default rule. Absent an agreement to the

5. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
6. See infra Part IV.A.2.
7. One could speak in the present tense here because significant characteristics ofthe
"traditional workplace" persist in certain jurisdictions, primarily those in which the legislature
and judiciary have been less than aggressive in expanding the legal rights of individual
employees. However, because the traditional workplace in its purest sense no longer exists
anywhere in the 1990s, I will refer to itin the past tense. See generallyLAWRENCEM. FRIEDMAN,
A HIsTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 553-63 (2d ed. 1985) (chronicling increasing regulation in the
United States).
8. The "shadow-of-the-law" concept has more than one meaning. For example, some
have used the phrase to emphasize the absence of governmental intervention. See Richard E.
Speidel, Afterword: The Shifting Domain of Contract, 90 Nw.U. L. REv. 254, 259 (1995).
According to Speidel, the arbitrationprocess itselfexists in the shadows because the government
is only marginally involved. However, as used in this Article, the shadow of law pertains more
to the adherence to self-enforcing, non-legal norms than to the absence of governmental
intervention. Although the two perspectives overlap, they are not quite the same.
9. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 276.
10. Id. at 553-63.
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contrary, employers were free to fire an employee in accordance with the
employment-at-will mantra from landmark decisions of the nineteenth century;
that is, "for good cause or for no cause, or even for bad cause."" Consequently,
if the employee failed to extract any concessions, the employment-at-will
doctrine established the terms of the parties' agreement or contract.
Whatever privileges employees theoretically enjoyed, in practice they
rarely altered the status quo. The right of employers to terminate employees at
will established the parties' agreement, but only in a technical sense. The terms
of such a contract did not reflect matters upon which the parties consciously
assented, nor were they indicative of a true "meeting of the minds" between
employer and employee.12 Instead, these contracts did nothing to alter the rights
enjoyed by the employer by virtue of prior court rulings. In essence, these
court-sanctioned, employer rights comprised the contract terms because
employees failed to negotiate a contract that imposed significant restraints upon
employers. This failure to negotiate resulted in a contract by default and a
reflection of the fact that the vast majority of employees could not exact more
favorable terms from employers. While the parties technically had an
agreement, such an arrangement does not contribute to a law-centered
relationship.
Because the workplace was not law-centered does not mean that employers
traditionally acted without significant restrictions in the area of employee
discharges. Other restraining factors came into play,'" the most notable being
a voluntary adherence to norms among parties in a long-term, ongoing
relationship. An important and interesting work considering the relationship
between norms and law is Robert C. Ellickson's book, Order Without Law, 4

11. Payne v. Western & Ati. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507,518 (1884), overruledby Hutton v.
Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915).
12. Commentators have noted some of the peculiarities of the "contract" in a nonunion employment relationship. See, for example, Clyde W. Summers, The Contract of
Employment and the Rights of IndividualEmployees: FairRepresentationand Employment at
Will, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 1082 (1984), where Professor Summers explains:
The employment at will doctrine is cast in contract language, but it has no
basis in contract law. The courts have not asked the basic contract
question-what did the parties intend? Both the overloaded presumption
and the superimposed spurious doctrines led the courts away from an
inquiry into what the parties, as reasonable persons, understood or
intended. It led to the anti-contract incantation that in the absence of a
specified term the employment was at will, regardless whether that fit the
parties' intent in entering and continuing the employment relationship.
Id. at 1099; see also Peter Linzer, The Decline ofAssent: At-Will Employment as a Case Study
of the Breakdown ofPrivateLaw Theory, 20 GA. L. REv. 323,409 (1986) ("Contract is a fiction
when applied to an institution like informal employment."); infranotes 38-40 and accompanying
text.
13. Although it is outside the scope of this Article, a desire to avoid unionization also
curtails the employer's arbitrary or malicious discharge of employees.
14. ROBERTC.ELLICKSON, ORDERWITHOLrTLAw: HoWNEIGHBORSSETrLEDISPUTES

(1991).
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which is an account of how members of a rural, agricultural region of
California resolved a variety of disputes arising from wayward cattle. The
author's introductory comments to his work are instructive for purposes of this
Article:
A principal finding is that [the parties] apply informal norms,
rather than formal legal rules, to resolve most of the issues
that arise among them. This finding is used as a springboard
for the development ...

of elements of a theory of how

people manage to interact to mutual advantage without the
help of a state or other hierarchical coordinator. The theory
seeks to predict the content of informal norms, to expose the
processes through which norms are generated, and to
demarcate the domain of human activity that falls
within-and beyond-the shadow of the law.'
Drawing parallels to Ellickson's book, Professors Rock and Wachter focus
on norms and the employment relationship in an article entitled The
EnforceabilityofNorms and the Employment Relationship.6 The authors note
that the employment relationship is particularly appropriate for study because
of the "bifurcated labor market: employment relationships that utilize norms,
the non-union sector, and employment relationships that utilize law, the union
sector." 7 Several aspects of the authors' views on distinguishing between
norms and law are helpful in coming to an understanding of how the shadow
of the law governed the traditional workplace:
The legal doctrine of at-will employment provides a
particularly interesting case for examining the relationship
between norms and law. In non-union workplaces, a clear
norm exists that an employer will not discharge an employee
without cause. As we will see, this norm can be understood
to arise in response to the distinctive contracting problems
that exist ....

This norm coexists with the traditional (and

apparently inconsistent) legal rule that, in the absence of an
explicit contract establishing a specific term of employment,
an employer generally can discharge an employee for good
reason, bad reason, or no reason at all (the doctrine of "at-will
employment").' s

15. Id. at 1.
16. Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability ofNorms and the
Employment Relationship,144 U. PA. L. REV. 1913 (1996).
17. Id. at 1916.
18. Id. at 1916-17.
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Rock and Wachter proceed to point out significant differences in the
respective cultures of union and non-union workplaces:
A striking feature of labor markets is that contracting is
polarized: either firms opt for almost entirely unwritten (and
unenforceable) agreements or firms adopt intricate, detailed,
written contracts, along with governance mechanisms for
adjudicating disputes and filling in gaps. The non-union
sector relies on unwritten and unenforceable contracts while
the union sector uses detailed collective bargaining
agreements.
In union workplaces, parties typically negotiate detailed
terms and, when disputes arise, resort to legally mandated
grievance procedures, with arbitration as a final step. In a
grievance, the parties will first try to negotiate a resolution, in
effect, renegotiating the terms of the contract, or, perhaps
more precisely, negotiating to fill in gaps that were (often
intentionally) left in the contract at the time of signing. When
the parties fail to negotiate a solution, and an arbitrator
adjudicates the dispute, the arbitrator will look to the
practices of the ILM [internal labor market] in order to fill in
the gaps. Here, one observes incorporation of norms in
contract interpretation. Indeed, one of the perceived
advantages of labor arbitration over court enforcement
involves the greater familiarity that an arbitrator is thought to
have with firm and industry norms.
But note a significant difference with the non-union
sector: in incorporating norms into their contract by means
of the arbitration provision, the union sector, paradoxically,
relies on norms less than the non-union sector, where the
relationship hinges almost entirely upon norms. In the
non-union sector, parties precommit not to use third party
enforcement.19

Thus, until recent years, non-union employment relationships have been
influenced by the law, but they have not been centered in the law. As noted
above, little evidence of a conscious agreement or understanding between
employers and employees regarding some of the more important terms of their
relationship exists. Employees and employers rarely made their rights and
duties relating to employee termination explicit in formalized contracts. In
short, non-union employment relationships existed in the shadow of the law.
Because the presumptive order minimized employers' obligations, no incentive

19. Id. at 1941 (footnote omitted).
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for employers to formalize or legalize their employee dealings existed. The
workplace of the 1990s is altogether different.
B. The Workplace in Transition: Changes to the Presumptive Order
Over the last two or three decades, the scope of employer discretion in
personnel matters has been significantly curtailed due to legislative and judicial
activism. As discussed below, these developments not only made the non-union
workplace more law-centered, they also provided employers of non-union
personnel with inducements to adopt arbitration as a method of resolving
employment disputes.
1.

The Impact ofLegislation

As late as 1960, the Fair Labor Standards Act was the only employment
law of consequence applicable to non-union employers.2" However, federal and
state legislation enacted since that time is imposing. One commentator's
chronicle of these laws gives a flavor of the avalanche of legislative activity in
the area:
[I]n the last thirty years, Congress has promulgated
numerous statutes establishing minimum terms for
employment relationships. In 1963, for example, Congress
enacted the Equal Pay Act, which prohibited wage
discrimination on the basis of sex. Other key statutes include
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964... , the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 . . . , the

Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, the Civil Service
Reform Act of 1978, the Employee Polygraph Protection Act
of 1988 . . . , the Americans with Disabilities Act of

1990 .... the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and the Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1993.
... In addition to enacting state statutes that parallel the

federal statutes listed above, state legislatures have passed
legislation protecting employees in a wide variety of other
circumstances. As of 1991, twenty-two states made
retaliatory dismissal for filing a workers' compensation claim
unlawful, thirty-four states have passed legislation protecting
whistle-blowers, and forty-two states regulate the
administration of employment-related lie detector tests. In
addition, many states restrict the use of drug testing in the
workplace, several have enforced workplace safety and health

20. See Bales, supra note 2, at 1875.
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violations, and some have enacted statutes to protect
employees from the adverse effects of corporate takeovers.
Montana enacted the first state statute protecting workers
from wrongful discharge, and similar statutes have been
passed in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.2
Recall the earlier reference to Professor Friedman's observation that
"[c]ontract as a branch of law can best be called residual; it dealt with those
areas of business life not otherwise regulated."22 As regulation of the workplace
increased, the "residual," consisting of those matters upon which employers
and employees were free to negotiate terms of employment, diminished. Yet,
notwithstanding all of this legislative activity, so long as the last citadel of the
employment-at-will doctrine remained intact, the workplace was not altogether
law-centered. Even though its lengthy and universal reign gave it the
appearance of impregnability, this doctrine suffered a sustained and somewhat
successful assault, launched by the judiciary.
2. JudicialDecisions
As early as 1988, Professor Theodore J. St. Antoine could justifiably state
that changes to the employment-at-will doctrine were so dramatic that reform
was heading toward "full flower."' He began a commentary on the subject by
crediting two authors as being instrumental to the changes:
"Seminal" is one of the most overworked words in the legal
lexicon. But if ever two pieces of writing deserved that
appellation, they are the 1967 article by Professor Lawrence
Blades advocating judicial development of the tort of
"abusive discharge" as a limitation on the doctrine of
employment at will, and the 1976 article by Professor Clyde
Summers advocating legislation to protect individual
employees against unjust dismissal.24
St. Antoine also noted that a substantial number of American courts
"employed three main theories to soften the worst rigors of what was once the
well-nigh universal rule that employers 'may dismiss their employees at will

21. Id. at 1875-77 (footnotes omitted).

22.

FRIEDMAN,

supra note 7, at 276.

23. Theodore J. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge Reform Heads
TowardFull Flower,67 NEB. L. RPv. 56,56 (1988).
24. Id. at 56-57 (footnotes omitted) (citing Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will
Vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise ofEmployer Power, 67 COLUM. L.
REV. 1404 (1967), and Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal:
Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481 (1976)).
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... for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong.'""u The three
doctrines sponsored by St. Antoine include "violations of public policy, or
'abusive' or 'retaliatory' discharge; breach of an express or implied contract;
and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 2 6 In addition to the
extensive use of his article by courts and commentators,2 7 Professor Blades
deserves credit for planting the seed for these common law exceptions to the
employment-at-will doctrine. With regard to statutory developments, in 1988
Professor St. Antoine believed that we were on the threshold of a flurry of
legislative activity that would extend "just cause" protection to employees
throughout the country, although he did allow for the possibility of some
delay.28 This flurry of activity has yet to occur. Montana was the only state that

had adopted legislation extending just-cause protections to employees at the
time of St. Antoine's prediction,29 and it remains the only such state.30
Consequently, it may be that Professor Summers's article will never have an
impact comparable to Professor Blades's.
The judicial exceptions alone significantly impact the manner in which
employers deal with their non-union employees.3' Most importantly, the
common law exceptions together with the individual legislative protections
discussed above (that relate to issues other than employment at will) bestow a
myriad of rights upon individual employees. While employees may still have

25. St. Antoine, supra note 23, at 58 (quoting Payne v. Western & Ati. R.R., 81 Tenn.
507, 519-20 (1884), overruled by Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915)).
26. Id.
27. At the time of publication of this Article, research indicated that Professor
Blades's article had been cited in 125 federal and state court decisions, and in approximately 200
law review articles.
28. St. Antoine, supra note 23, at 81. Portions of St. Antoine's article predict the
battles that employment legislation will face and attempt to take into account "both the ideal and
the politically feasible." Id. at 71. St. Antoine concludes:
In this the twentieth anniversary year of Blades's
truly seminal piece, an academic consensus has
blossomed, a judicial consensus has taken root, and
the makings of a legislative consensus have been
planted. Whether it will be in the coming decade or
the following, we shall shortly see on the legal
landscape only the decaying husk of the doctrine of
employment at will. The far more wholesome theory
ofjust cause will have taken its place.
Id. at 81 (footnote omitted).
29. See id. at 71.
30. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-901 (1997).
31. The employment-at-will rule and its exceptions are relevant to this Article, but
that fact does not warrant extensive treatment of the complex issue here. For recent writings on
the issue, see Mary A. Bedikian, TransformingAt-Will Employment Disputes into Wrongful
Discharge Claims: Fertile Groundfor ADR, 1993 J. Disp. RESOL. 113, 120-31 (1993), and
Hayford & Evers, supra note 4, at 456-83.
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confidence that self-enforcing norms play an important role in the workplace,32
they also recognize that a wide array of legal constraints limit their employers'
actions. Consequently, although norms that reflect ideas of fair play continue
to guide employers to some extent, it would be inconceivable for employers to
discharge employees without paying close attention to the legal ramifications.
C. The Modern Workplace and the CurrentReceptiveness ofArbitration
Developments over the past twenty-five to thirty years have left the
modem non-union workplace teetering between two models of industrial
governance. The older model, pursuant to which employers made personnel
decisions in accordance with self-enforced norms and only in the shadow of the
law, is not altogether extinct;33 nonetheless, the hold of the older approach is
precarious, at best, in the face of strong competition from a law-centered model
of workplace governance. This phenomenon partially explains the appeal of
employment arbitration and the employer's motives.
Employers previously refiained from arbitration or any other formalized
dispute resolution procedure because "legalizing" one aspect of the
employment relationship might lead to a similar result in other areas. In light
of non-legal governance being the rule rather than the exception, formalizing
any aspect of the employment relationship potentially contaminated the whole.
Because the non-union employment relationship is now so heavily regulated,
the portion remaining in the shadow of the law is relatively limited. Therefore,
arbitrating employee grievances poses no real threat to an informal, non-legal
atmosphere.
As previously discussed, prior to recent developments, employers found
comfort in the status quo because the basic principle underlying the
employment-at-will rule greatly favored them.34 The presumptive order,
rebuttable only by the parties' agreement to the contrary, was that employers
could fire an employee for good, bad, or no reason. Thus, prior to the 1960s
employers enjoyed the default terms under the employment-at-will rule, which
were more favorable to them than any potential express contract terms.
However, as current decisions recognizing exceptions to the employment-atwill rule multiply and the presumptive order falls apart, employers must abide
by a wider range of policy-driven, court-imposed obligations. In the past, the
alternative to a neutral arbitrator looking over the employer's shoulder was a
judge who would likely find a contract which, by default, allowed the employer

32. For example, employees undoubtedly continue to expect employers to reward
such things as loyalty and lengthy service and to act in a moral and decent manner.
33. While there is no escaping the dictates of federal legislation, employment-at-will
exceptions in some states have been narrowly circumscribed thus far.
34. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
35. See Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507,518 (1884), overndedby Hutton
v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915).
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to do as it wished. Now, the alternative to a neutral arbitrator is a judge who
may be predisposed to recognize the existence of a contract in which the
employer's actions are constrained by one or more exceptions to the
employment-at-will rule. Under these present circumstances, arbitration is
obviously the more appealing alternative.
In addition to the removal of these earlier disincentives, employers have
affirmative reasons to adopt arbitration. As they acclimate to a law-centered
environment in which statutes and judicial decisions arm non-union employees
with an impressive array of fights, employers must come to grips with a
tremendous increase in the risks and other pitfalls associated with litigation.
The possibility of exorbitant jury verdicts, including the imposition of punitive
damages in some situations, is one such risk. 6 Employers must also contend
with the chance and even the likelihood that the common law in this area may
evolve in an unanticipated manner, exposing them to liability on new theories.
Employment-at-will cases present employers with difficulties in predicting
outcomes. Again, arbitration presents an attractive alternative. Employers stand
to gain by having an arbitrator resolve disputes relating to wrongful discharge
claims, but arbitration may also be a catalyst for some fairly important changes
in the employment relationship. Some of these changes may be
undesirable-and surprising-to employers. Before addressing these other
ramifications, a discussion ofboth employment arbitration and the employment
relationship that could further transform the non-union workplace is required.
III. FACTORS INHERENT TO THE ARBITRATION PROCESS AND EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIP INDUCIVE TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONTRACT

For some of the reasons already discussed, the non-union employment
relationship has been a hostile environment for formalized contracts, but the
inception of arbitration to resolve employment disputes changes that
environment. Two factors in particular, the arbitration process and the nature
of the employment relationship, should provide fertile ground for contract to
take root.
A. Employment Arbitration and Labor Arbitration:
Endeavors

Two Distinct

By virtue of its lofty status, not to mention its head start of a half-century
or more, labor arbitration will inevitably be the benchmark by which

36. See Denenberg & Denenberg, supra note 2, at 49 ("As William B. Gould IV, the
chairman of the National Labor Relations Board, has noted: 'The employer [that adopts
arbitration] would be rid of the unpredictability of the jury system and the accompanying
possibility of unlimited punitive and compensatory damages."').

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

13

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 6
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. SO: 183

employment arbitration is measured.37 Moreover, many of the conventions and
other features of labor arbitration will naturally influence employment
arbitration practices. Therefore, although the focus of this Article is
employment arbitration and not labor arbitration, a brief comparison ofthe two
will prove useful to later discussion.
Labor arbitration occupies an authoritative position in the sphere of labor
relations. Both labor andmanagement enthusiastically endorse the process, and
with few exceptions,3" legal scholars and other commentators appear enamored
with it as well.39 Perhaps most importantly, the deference of the judicial system
to labor arbitration is extraordinary. 4° Employment arbitration may eventually
establish areputation comparable to that of labor arbitration-widely acclaimed
by the parties'4" celebrated by the academic community,4 2 and deferred to by
the courts.43 However, several features of initial employment arbitration
practices make that quest problematic. To the extent that the objective is to
model employment arbitration after more successful traditions of labor
arbitration, it would seem that the employment arbitrator's role needs to be
clearly defined, as do the rights of employees. Accomplishing these goals
appears to invite, if not demand, the development ofprocedural and substantive
contractual rights.
The distinctions between labor arbitration and employment arbitration that
focus attention on the need for clarification of the arbitrator's role and the
nature and scope of employee rights are three-fold. First, the focal point of
labor arbitration is invariably a formal contract, the collective bargaining
agreement, with well-defined terms that are understood by the parties."
Employer obligations and employee rights are relatively transparent, and the

37. For a thorough and insightful comparison of labor arbitration and employment
arbitration, see Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, PrivatizingJustice: A Jurisprudential
Perspectiveon Laborand Employment Arbitrationfrom the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 1187 (1993).
38. For perhaps the most notable criticism, see PAUL R. HAYS, LABOR ARBITRATION:
A DISSENTING VIEW (1966). Also see Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073,
1082 (1984), where the author argues that "[t]he dispute-resolution story trivializes the remedial
dimensions of lawsuits."
39. See, e.g., Charles B. Craver, LaborArbitrationas a Continuationofthe Collective
BargainingProcess,66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 571 (1990) (discussing the role of arbitration in
collective bargaining).
40. See, e.g., ELKOURI &ELKOURI, HOWARBITRATIONoORKS 29 (Marlin M. Volz &
Edward P. Goggin eds., 5th ed. 1997) (noting that the courts "have honored the 'private contract'
nature of arbitration by wisely limiting their roles in the process.").
41. See, e.g., Bales, supra note 2, at 1870 (noting that "[a]rbitration [has] completed
the metaphor of industrial organization as a self-contained mini-democracy").
42. See, e.g., Bernard D. Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology, Law, and Labor
Arbitration,34 U. C-I. L. REv. 545, 561 (1967) (expounding on the "usefulness of arbitration
and the integrity of arbitrators").
43. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 40, at 29.
44. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960)
(focusing on collective bargaining agreements).
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contract is a check on the arbitrator's power because it is the sole source from
which the arbitrator derives authority.45 Most likely, none of these statements
will pertain to the typical non-union situation. Second, labor arbitration is a
triangular affair, one that involves the collective bargaining representative, the
employer, and the employee, which is significant because of the belief that
unionized employees are more likely to be on a level playing field.16 The power
of the union is an important factor in the perceived fairness of the
proceedings.47 Employment arbitration, on the other hand, pits individual
employees against their respective employers. Finally, labor arbitration sets out
to resolve problems that arise from private lawmaking, as defined by the
parties' own creation-the contract. By contrast, the adjudication of employee
rights that are based on public legislation will occupy a prominent position in
employment arbitration. Each of these distinctions is discussed below.
1. When the "DesignatedContractReader" Has Nothing to Read
Unionized employees have little doubt as to the meaning of their labor
contracts or agreements. In fact, the contract takes on a tangible reality in most
union shops, when the union steward and other officers of the local union
instinctively reach for dog-eared copies of a collective bargaining agreement
to answer questions or to challenge the employer's authority on particular
decisions. Many supervisors and other managerial officials, not just the labor
relations professionals, are also intimately familiar with the parties' contract
and regularly consult it for guidance in carrying out various personnel
decisions. Not every unionized workplace follows such a pattern, but for a
substantial portion of the dealings between employers and employees to
revolve around interpretations of a highly visible agreement is not unusual. In
such instances, a culture of widespread contract familiarity naturally develops.
When a neutral arbitrator considers unresolved grievances, the centrality
of the parties' contract is brought into focus, as evidenced by the observations
of numerous courts and commentators. 4s For example, in one decision from the
famous Steelworkers Trilogy49 the United States Supreme Court wrestled with
the matter of arbitrability, declaring that:
[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of

45. Id. at 597.
46. See Samuel Issacharoff, ContractingforEmployment: The Limited Return of the
Common Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1783 (1996).
47. See id.
48. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 597
(explaining that an arbitrator's authority is derived from the collective bargaining agreement);
Meltzer, supra note 42, at 558.
49. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
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the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to
dispense his own brand of industrial justice. He may of
course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is
legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the
collective bargaining agreement. When the arbitrator's words
manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice
but to refuse enforcement of the award.5"
The focus on the contract itself has been a key issue in other legal disputes
relating to labor arbitration. One nagging issue in labor arbitration involves the
arbitrator's responsibility when an award warranted by the collective
bargaining agreement is repugnant to either statutory mandates or public
policies."' The reasoning of some scholars on this question confirms the
dominant role of the parties' contract. For example, ProfessorBernard Meltzer,
one of the leading proponents of the view that arbitral fidelity extends
principally to the contract, cautioned that "[a]rbitrators should in general accord
a similar respect to the agreement that is the source of their authority and
should leave to the courts or other official tribunals the determination of
whether the agreement contravenes a higher law,"5'2 because the arbitrator is
"the proctor of the agreement and not of the statutes."5'3 The point is perhaps
most simply and concisely made by Professor St. Antoine in his statement that
the labor arbitrator is the parties' designated "contract reader."5'4
While the employment contract is quite tangible to most unionized
employees, it could not be more obscure and nebulous to their non-union
counterparts. As one commentator states, "In most cases, of course, the
'contract' is invisible: the terms and conditions are those fixed unilaterally by
the employer, subject to the minima prescribed by statute. Employees
'negotiate' only by accepting or rejecting the employer's proffered terns." 55
Granted, certain valuable employees are able to negotiate some form of job
security, such as tenure, into an individualized contract. However, ill-defined
employment contracts, to the extent that a contract is even perceived to exist,
are more common. Neither the employers nor the employees are likely able to
articulate the terms of their relationship; only those who are somewhat
sophisticated in legal matters would envision the existence of a contract in the
absence of a tangible document, signed by the parties, and setting forth the

50. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 597.
51. See generally Patricia A. Greenfield, How Do ArbitratorsTreatExternal Law?
45 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 683, 691 (1992) (discussing arbitration use and the consideration
of statutory standards when making determinations).
52. Meltzer, supra note 42, at 558.
53. Id. at 560.
54. Theodore J. St. Antoine, JudicialReview ofLaborArbitrationAwards: A Second
Look at Enterprise Wheel andIts Progeny, 75 MicH. L. REv. 1137, 1140 (1977).
55. Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair,Starting Over: Imagininga Labor Lawfor
UnorganizedWorkers, 69 CHI.-KENTL. REv. 59, 69 (1993) (footnote omitted).
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terms of their legal relationship. 6
For an arbitration system to be effective in a non-union environment, both
employers and employees must have confidence in the erhiployment arbitration
process. For this to occur, all parties must understand the limits of the
arbitrator's authority. As deliberated earlier, labor arbitrators are creatures of
the collective bargaining agreement; thus, infidelity to the agreement can result
in the nullification of their decision. 7 While the absence of a contract in the
non-union context may be tolerated initially, as employment arbitrationmatures
and employment relationships become more sophisticated, the parties will
undoubtedly become dissatisfied with submitting their disputes to an arbitrator
who has only a vague set of standards for guidance. Ironically, dissatisfaction
with arbitration may be intensified if the courts begin to exhibit a nondeferential attitude toward arbitration decisions due to concerns regarding the
scope of the arbitrator's authority.

2. The Solo Employee Versus the Employer
The increased use of employment arbitration has caused legal scholars to
begin paying attention to it. Yet the process already has its detractors. Some of
the harshest criticism of employment arbitration stems from the fact that
employees act individually, unlike labor arbitration where the collective
strength of the union is brought to bear for the benefit of employees." Other

56. In noting the significance ofthe employment-at-will doctrine which governs many
non-unionjob relationships, Professor Clyde W. Summers makes several insightful observations
regarding its effect; namely, Summers notes the historic "invisibility" of the employment
contract for non-union employees:
The important point here is that judicial
acceptance of the employment at will doctrine
effectively eliminated for most workers all rights as
to the future from the contract of employment, and
thereby drained it of all substantial content....
When employment is at will, contractual
rights and duties largely disappear or become empty
shells, for rights and duties arising out of a continuing
relationship can have little substance when either
party can terminate the relationship at any moment
for any or no reason . . . . Addison, though
theoretically incorrect, was substantially right when
he stated, "there is in truth no contract of hiring at
all."
Summers, supra note 12, at 1085 (quoting 2 C. G. ADDISON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACr § 887 (3d Am. ed., Jersey City, N.J. 1883)).
57. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597

(1960).
58. See Samuel Issacharoff, ContractingforEmployment: The Limited Return ofthe
Common Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1783 (1996). Professor Issacharoff states:
Not only do unions offer the services of shop
stewards or other union officials who handle large
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criticisms focus on the fact that employers present arbitration clauses within the
context of adhesion contracts." Scholars also criticize several systemic
advantages of employers, such as their "sophisticated understanding of the
process and the 'institutional memory' needed to wrest an advantage" 6 during
arbitration. Another possibility is that arbitrators will be biased in an
employer's favor because the employer is a repeat player, while the employee
is merely a one-time participant.6' Critics have also questioned whether
employees will be adequately represented at their arbitration hearings, or
whether they will be severely disadvantaged because employers are more likely
to use experienced advocates.62 Even pro-arbitration commentators have noted
that "[a]ny system of arbitrating disputes without a union, even one created
with the best of intentions, will require a number of structural adaptations., 63
Most criticisms focus on shortcomings of the current employment arbitration
process and argue for the implementation of procedural reforms to safeguard
the interests of individual employees."
The pressure to assure procedural protections for non-union employees in
the arbitration process will likely continue. Some of the criticism has been so
strident that it is difficult to foresee how employment arbitration can ever be
accepted as a legitimate means, like labor arbitration and other ADR
mechanisms, unless the process guarantees significant procedural rights to
employees. Securing such rights would, of course, contribute mightily to the
establishment of contractual protections for employees and thus create a lawcentered relationship.

numbers of grievance and arbitration procedures, but
also they have access to collective funds to pay for
lawyers in major arbitrations. Neither the expertise
born of experience nor the ability to tap collective
resources for the creation of a public good is
available to individual employees facing discharge.
Id. at 1806 n.75.
59. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against
Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64
UMKC L. REv. 449, 474-76 (1996); Michael Z. Green, Preempting Justice Through Binding
ArbitrationofFutureDisputes: MereAdhesion Contractsora Trapforthe Unwary Consumer?,
5 Loy.CONSUMERL.REP. 112, 117-19(1993); JenniferA. Marler, Note,ArbitratingEmployment
DiscriminationClaims: The Lower Courts Extend Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. to
Include IndividualEmployment Contracts,74 WASH. U. L.Q. 443, 471-73 (1996).
60. Denenberg & Denenberg, supranote 2, at 49.
61. See Cole, supra note 59, at 452-54,474; Denenberg & Denenberg, supra note 2,
at 50; Samuel Estreicher, Arbitration ofEmployment Disputes Without Unions, 66 CHI-KENTL.
REV. 753, 764-65 (1990); Matthew W. Finkin, Commentary on "Arbitrationof Employment
Disputes Without Unions," 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 799, 800 (1990).
62. On the importance of experienced advocates in the ADR process, see Edward
Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternate Dispute Resolution, 62 TuL. L. REv. 1, 45-47
(1987).
63. Denenberg & Denenberg, supra note 2, at 49.
64. See supranotes 44-47 and accompanying text.
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3.

VindicatingStatutory Rights: New Gristfor the Arbitration
Mill

The nature of labor arbitration is such that the focus is upon the contractual
rights and obligations as set forth in the collective bargaining agreement. These
contracted rights commonly overlap with statutory rights; nevertheless, the
labor arbitrator's primary purpose is to adjudicate any contract in dispute.65
Statutory-based claims have traditionally played an incidental role in labor
arbitration cases.66 Employment arbitration, on the other hand, will likely differ
from labor arbitration in that statutory rights will, by the design of employers,
occupy a relatively prominent place in the cases. Indeed, in the post-Gilmerera,
many employers of non-union employees may well envision employment
arbitration as involving statutory-based claims almost exclusively.
As noted above, 67 employment arbitration generally has engendered calls
for procedural reform to protect individual employee rights. Because statutory
right could be adjudicated in a non-governmental forum perhaps has been the
most compelling factor behind the push for procedural reforms and protections.
Arguably, courts and administrative agencies are, by training and orientation,
dedicated to the aggressive enforcement of public policy as expressed by
legislation. In contrast, arbitrators are creatures of the parties' private
agreement,68 which gives rise to concerns over the privatization of justice
through employment arbitration, especially given the employment arbitrator's
accountability to only the private, appointing authorities. Unlike employment
arbitrators, labor arbitrators are accountable to the legislative authorities who
enacted the labor law arbitration standards.69 In employment arbitration the
applicable law is public while the arbitrator's accountability is private, which
fuels critics' demands for constraints on employment arbitrators. To whom
should employment arbitrators be ultimately accountable? What general
standards ofjustice should they apply when interpreting employment statutes?
What standards should courts use in reviewing employment arbitrators'
decisions? In some ways, the issue of the arbitrator's public and private
divergence overlaps the concern that an individual employee will be
disadvantaged when arbitrating a dispute.70 However, ajudicating statutory

65. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,597 (1960).
66. Some of the rationale in the Gilmer decision could be read to allow for more
arbitration of statutory-based claims in the unionized workplace in the future, although the
Supreme Court has yet to rule specifically on this point.
67. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
68. See Cole, supra note 59, at 455-56.
69. Malin & Ladenson, supra note 37, at 1226-40. Principally focusing upon the
accountability issue, Professors Malin and Ladenson make a strong case against employment
arbitration and argue for stronger institutional constraints on employment arbitrators, including
de novo judicial review of arbitral interpretations of law. Id.
70. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
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rights will necessitate minimum due process guarantees.7 '
In summary, labor arbitration's prominent role is the result of a
combination of factors. The parties in a unionized environment embrace
arbitration because it is advantageous to both. Courts defer to labor arbitration
decisions, and legal scholars and commentators support the process because it
is quite compatible with a number of important national labor and employment
policies. Employment arbitration, on the other hand, will establish itself as a
legitimate alternative to litigation only if it too serves and protects the rights of
all parties and develops in conformity with public policies.72 Achieving these
objectives will require the parties to be more attendant to the formal recognition
of contractual terms or their functional equivalent.
Certain attributes of the arbitration process will promote the development
of a contractual ordering, but are not the sole reasons that a detailed
formalization of employer duties and employee rights will eventually emerge.
The very nature of the employment relationship fosters such a development
because it is a "highly relational exchange."

71. The process of arbitrating statutory claims could also have an impact on the
substantive terms ofthe contract between an employer and its non-union employees. In resolving
disputes based on statutory claims, arbitrators may occasionally engage in a far-ranging
scrutinization of employment policies and practice and render decisions that have an impact
beyond the circumstances of the aggrieved employee. Admittedly, courts and administrative
agencies can and do proceed in a similar fashion. However, the arbitration process may seem less
threatening and more accessible to employees, and, therefore, may be more frequently utilized.
Also, an arbitrator may be more apt to fashion a "creative" remedy than a court or an
administrative agency. Again, a move away from self-enforcing norms toward a law-centered
workplace appears inevitable.
72. Some might argue that employment arbitration can never expect to receive the
judicial deference that is afforded labor arbitration because labor arbitration is more than a
method of resolving disputes; it is viewed as an extension of the collective bargaining process
itself. Dean Harry Shulman articulated as much in the 1950s:
The arbitration may be resented by either party as an
impairment of its authority or power. It is susceptible
of use for buck-passing and face-saving. And it may
sometimes encourage litigiousness. But when the
system works fairly well, its value is great. To
consider its feature of arbitration as a substitute for
court litigation or as the consideration for a no-strike
pledge is to take a foreshortened view of it. In a sense
it is a substitute for both-but in the sense in which a
transport airplane is a substitute for a stagecoach. The
arbitration is an integral part of the system of selfgovernment.
Harry Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L. REv. 999, 1024
(1955); see also Charles B. Craver, Labor Arbitration as a Continuation of the Collective
BargainingProcess,66 CIII.-KENTL. REV. 571 (1990) (discussing the role of arbitration in labor
arrangements); Julius G. Getman, LaborArbitrationandDisputeResolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916,
917 (1979) (discussing how "[c]ollective bargaining shapes labor arbitration and gives it
power").
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B. Relational ContractTheory
Analyzing the legal relationships that exist between employers and
employees when no union is involved can be somewhat perplexing. Although
73
litigants, as well as the courts, invariably resort to the "'rhetoric of contract"'
when resolving employment disputes, in some ways the parties' contractual
relationship seems to encompass much more-and much less-than what lay
persons and some legal analysts consider when they contemplate a contract.
Over the past two to three decades, the traditional employment-at-will rule
has been subjected to an assault resulting in a myriad of exceptions to the rule.74
Moreover, while commentators have often used contract principles to explain
and justify the employment-at-will rule,75 the exceptions being generated are
increasingly difficult to explain under established contract theory.76 While
newer theories of contract "that depart substantially from the usual ways that
the law has been conceptualized ' 77 may not be universally accepted, the
insights of some of these theories can be quite illuminating in particular
circumstances. The nature of the employment relationship is such that relational
contract theory appears to be a valuable tool for understanding the evolution of
the law in this area. Understanding the fundamental premises of relational
contract theory may enhance one's78 appreciation for the role arbitration could
play in the emergence of contract.

73. See Linzer, supra note 12, at 327 (quoting Victor Brudney, Corporate
Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1403, 1403
(1985)).
74. See supra text accompanying notes 26-32.
75. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
76. See Linzer, supra note 12, at 345-56. With regard to the employment-at-will
exceptions, Linzer notes that in some instances they seem to be "old wine in new bottles" and,
in other cases, "new wine in old bottles." Id. at 345.
77. Jay M. Feinman, The Significance of Contract Theory, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 1283,
1283 (1990).
78. For an illuminating look at the interaction of various theories of contract, see
Robert A. Hillman, The Crisis in Modern Contract Theory, 67 TEx. L. REv. 103 (1988).
Reflecting upon the zeal and sometimes myopic views of contract scholars, Professor Hillman
observes that"[s]ome analysts even take the position that one can explain all ofmodem contract
law solely on the basis of one principle or another." Id. at 104. He counters with his view, based
on "a flexible, pragmatic model of modem contract law," id.at 103, and argues that "all we can
hope and need to know is that freedom of contract and other principles share the spotlight." Id.
at 104. Similarly, Hillman concludes that "[in short, conflicting and complex theories,
principles, rules, and policies dominate modem contract law and together govern the relations
ofpeople in our society." Id. at 133. Professor Hillman considers several theories in this essay,
including the relational vision of contract law. Consistent with his balanced perspective
regarding other theories, Professor Hillman demonstrates how modem contract law comprehends
relationalism's "description ofreality," id. at 127, concluding that "[m]odem contract law is not
only relevantbut also reasonably well suited for today's highly relational world. Modem contract
law's broad view of'agreement' reinforces relational norms; in many instances, these norms also
constitute enforceable contract terms." Id. at 135.
Professor Hillman's arguments are persuasive in that no single theory, including
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1. The FundamentalsofRelationalContract Theory
Commentators have credited Professor Ian Macneil with originating the
relational theory. 79 Accordingly, Professor Macneil's writings are a good place
to begin for a general understanding of the theory." Professor Macneil
identifies contracts that involve ongoing relations as a distinctive form of
economic exchange, one that is to be differentiated from exchanges not
involving a continuing relationship between the parties:
Contractual ordering of economic activity takes place
along a spectrum of transactional and relational behavior. At
one end are discrete transactions. Discrete transactions are
contracts of short duration, involving limited personal
interactions, and with precise party measurements of easily
measured objects of exchange, for example, money and grain.
They require a minimum of future cooperative behavior
between the parties and no sharing of benefits or burdens.
They bind the two parties tightly and precisely. The parties
view such transactions as deals free of entangling strings, and
they certainly expect no altruism. The parties see virtually
everything connected with such transactions as clearly
defined and presentiated. If trouble is anticipated at all, it is
anticipated only if someone or something turns out
unexpectedly badly. The epitome of discrete contract
transactions: at noon two strangers come into town from

relational contract theory, can explain all ofmodem contract law and that modem contract law
incorporates relational principles when appropriate. Arguably ,the manner in which modem
contract law comprehends relationalism's "description of reality" is readily apparent in the
employment law context.
79. E.g., RANDY E. BARNETr, CoNTRAcrs 1263 (1995) ("The undisputed originator
of relational theory is Professor Ian Macneil.").

80. The relational theory is quite complex and naturally must be oversimplified here.
Materials that address this topic in detail abound. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz &Robert E. Scott,
Principlesof Relational Contracts,67 VA. L. REv. 1089, 1091 (1981) (describing the "core

provisions of relational contracts" and relating these performance standards to their contractual
provisions); Wallace K.Lightsey,A Critiqueofthe PromiseModel of Contract,26 WM. &MARY
L. REv. 45, 48 (1984) ("criticizing the promise model of contract and suggesting an alternative
model"); Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L.
REV. 483 (1985) [hereinafter Relational Contract] (providing a comprehensive summary of

relational contract law); Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract: InternalandExternal, 78 Nw. U.
L. REV. 340, 341 (1983) [hereinafter Values in Contract] (discussing "three intersecting
dimensions" in the universe of contract to better comprehend contractual values); William C.
Whitford, Ian Macneil's Contribution to Contracts Scholarship, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 545, 545
(1985) (discussing "the impact of Macneil's writings on the work of other academics writing

about contract law"). Two articles that consider contract theories more generally, but that also
provide relatively concise descriptions of relational contract essentials are Feinman, supra note
77, at 1299-304, and Hillman, supra note 78, at 123-28.
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opposite directions, one walking and one riding a horse. The
walker offers to buy the horse, and after brief dickering a deal
is struck in which delivery of the horse is to be made at
sundown upon the handing over of $10. The two strangers
expect to have nothing to do with each other between now
and sundown; they expect never to see each other thereafter;
and each has as much feeling for the other as has a Viking
trading with a Saxon. A modem example with many of these
characteristics is a purchase of nonbrand name gasoline in a
strange town one does not expect to see again.
At the other end of the contract spectrum are ongoing
relations. Being more diverse than well-honed discrete
transactions, they are more difficult to describe concisely, but
the following are typical characteristics. The relations are of
significant duration (for example, franchising). Close whole
person relations form an integral part of the relation
(employment). The object of exchange typically includes both
easily measured quantities (wages) and quantities not easily
measured (the projection of personality by an airline
stewardess). Many individuals with individual and collective
poles of interest are involved in the relation (industrial
relations). Future cooperative behavior is anticipated (the
players and management of the New York Yankees). The
benefits and burdens of the relation are to be shared rather
than entirely divided and allocated (a law partnership). The
entangling strings of friendship, reputation, interdependence,
morality, and altruistic desires are integral parts ofthe relation
(a theatrical agent and his clients, a corporate management
team). Trouble is expected as a matter of course (a collective
bargaining agreement). Finally, the participants never intend
or expect to see the whole future of the relation as
presentiated at any single time, but view the relation as an
ongoing integration of behavior to grow and vary with events
in a largely unforeseeable future (a marriage; a family
business)."
Professor Macneil argues that the doctrinal law associated with classical and
neo-classical contract theories is generally appropriate for cases involving
discrete exchanges, but that these contract principles are ill-suited for relational
contracts.82 While neo-classical contract theory focuses on the promises or
assent of the parties in determining duties owed, the relational contract
81.

IANR. MACNEIL, CONTRACTS: EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS

12-13

(1978).
82. See Relational Contract,supra note 80; Values in Contract,supra note 80.
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approach begins with a premise that the promise is not the only, or even the
most, important and effective projector of exchange.3 According to Macneil,
"Command, status, social role, kinship, bureaucratic patterns, religious
obligation, habit and other internalizations all may and do achieve such
projections." 4
A couple of critical points should be emphasized. First, when visualized
along Macneil's spectrum of transactional and relational behavior, employment
is one of the most highly relational of all economic exchanges." Second, the
promises or assent of the parties is by no means the principal basis of contract
for highly relational exchanges. Other factors such as status, habit, and norms
in some ways play a more prominent role. 6
2. RelationalContractPrinciplesat Work in the ArbitrationContext
Some of the most influential academic writers on the subject of labor and
employment law are experienced labor arbitrators." As such, their scholarship
provides insight into both the theoretical aspects of contract law and the more
practical considerations faced by professional arbitrators. Although some of the
earlier scholarship pre-dates much of Professor Macneil's work and, therefore,
does not include the terminology associated with relational contracts, parallels
to relational contract theory are unmistakable. Particularly noteworthy is the
recognition that agreements are invariably incomplete and that the parties
intend for a "contract reader" to flesh out the terms when a problem arises.88
Thus, Dean Shulman argues:
83. Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts,47 S. CAL. L. RE V. 691, 715
(1974).
84. Id. (footnote omitted).
85. Professor Macneil analogizes the distinction between transactions and relations
to that made by sociologists between nonprimary and primary relations. He observes:
Three characteristics distinguish primary from
nonprimary relations. First, in the former, response is
to whole persons rather than to segments ....
Second, in a primary relation,
communication is deep and extensive... '[while i]n
nonprimary relations communication is limited to
specific topics' ....
The third characteristic ofprimary relations
is that personal satisfactions are paramount ....
Id. at 722. In summary, he distinguishes contract transactions from contract relations by stating
that "although both involve economic exchange, only the latter include whole person relations,
relatively deep and extensive communication by a variety of modes, and significant elements of
non-economic personal satisfaction." Id. at 723. He goes on to note that "[ifn our society, the
most primary contractual relation is marriage, with employment relations likely to be next." Id.
at 725.
86. Id. at 715.
87. See, e.g., Shulman, supra note 72 (providing insight into arbitration based upon
his experience as a labor arbitrator).
38. See St. Antoine, supranote 54, at 1140.
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There is never.., enough time to do an impeccable job of
draftsmanship after substantive agreement is reached ....
...[For this and related reasons, the labor] agreement then
becomes a compilation of diverse provisions: some provide
objective criteria almost automatically applicable; some
provide more or less specific standards which require reason
and judgment in their application; and some do little more
than leave problems to future consideration with an
expression of hope and good faith." 89
Professor Archibald Cox expresses similar views, characterizing the labor
contract as "an instrument of government, not merely an instrument of
exchange [and as] 'the industrial constitution of the enterprise, setting forth the
broad general principles upon which the relationship of employer and
employee is to be conducted."' 9 Finally, Professor Alan Schwartz observes

that one of the marked characteristics of collective agreements is their
incompleteness and that, when litigation ensues, courts frequently complete the
contract by filling in the omitted terms. 9'

89. Shulman, supra note 72, at 1004, 1005.
90. Archibald Cox, Reflections Upon LaborArbitration,72 HARv.L.REv. 1482,1492
(1959) (quoting NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 110 F.2d 632, 638 (4th Cir. 1940)). The text
surrounding the quoted excerpt gives one a broader appreciation of the author's perspective:
The resulting contract is essentially an
instrument of government, not merely an instrument
of exchange. "The trade agreement thus becomes, as
it were, the industrial constitution of the enterprise,
setting forth the broad general principles upon which
the relationship of employer and employee is to be
conducted." It is largely for these reasons that
collective-bargaining agreements provide their own
administrative or judicial machinery-the ascending
steps of the grievance procedure culminating in final
and binding arbitration. The administration of a labor
contract often resembles the administration of a basic
statute by a specialized agency such as the Federal
Trade Commission or the National Labor Relations
Board.
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting HighlansParkMfg., 110 F.2d at 638).
91. Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete
Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 272 (1992). Professor Alan
Schwartz observes that relational scholars disagree about how courts should supply terms to an
incomplete contract. Id. at 275. He notes that some would adhere to an "'external' relational
approach" by using norms that transcend the relationship; that is, "judges should be guided by
society's sense of what is fair, distributionally just, and adequately participatory." Id. Other
relational scholars argue that the "norms of the relationship" should be the source from which
the rules are derived. Id. According to Professor Schwartz, this "internal" relational approach
could then follow one of two possibilities: "One possibility is to view contractual relationships
as little societies in which values evolve over time. Then, criteria for resolving disputes inhere
in the interpretation that best reconciles these 'local' values." Id. at 276. The "second way.., is
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Several passages in the SteelworkersTrilogy indicate that the United States
Supreme Court is not oblivious to the relational aspects of a collective
bargaining agreement. For example, the resonance of the relational contract
principles is obvious in the Warrior & Gulf decision, where the Court
explained that the collective bargaining agreement "is more than a contract; it
is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases that the draftsmen cannot
wholly anticipate."'92 In light of such reasoning, one could plausibly argue that
the Court deferred to arbitration in the Trilogy partly because it recognized the
relational nature of the employment contract. Assuming that to be the case,
making the additional observation that arbitrators are capable of fleshing out
incomplete contractual terms becomes important. Thus, the Court stated:
The labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the parties'
confidence in his knowledge of the common law of the shop
and their trust in his personal judgment to bring to bear
considerations which are not expressed in the contract as

to base decisional criteria on what parties probably expect of each other." Id.
92. United Steelworkers v. Warrior& GulfNavigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,578 (1960).
A more extensive excerpt from the opinion may be helpful in identifying the Court's recognition
of relational concepts:
The collective bargaining agreement states
the rights and duties of the parties. It is more than a
contract; it is a generalized code to govern a myriad
of cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly
anticipate. The collective agreement covers the whole
employment relationship. It calls into being a new
common law-the common law of a particular
industry or of a particular plant....
... Gaps may be left to be filled in by
reference to the practices of the particular industry
and of the various shops covered by the agreement.
Many of the specific practices which underlie the
agreement may be unknown, except in hazy form,
even to the negotiators. Courts and arbitration in the
context of most commercial contracts are resorted to
because there has been a breakdown in the working
relationship of theparties; such resort is the unwanted
exception. But the grievance machinery under a
collective bargaining agreement is at the very heart of
the system of industrial self-government. Arbitration
is the means of solving the unforeseeable by molding
a system of private law for all the problems which
may arise and to provide for their solution in a way
which will generally accord with the variant needs
and desires of the parties. The processing of disputes
through the grievance machinery is actually a vehicle
by which meaning and content are given to the
collective bargaining agreement.
Id. at 578-81 (citation and footnote omitted).
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criteria for judgment. The parties expect that his judgment of
a particular grievance will reflect not only what the contract
says but, insofar as the collective bargaining agreement
permits, such factors as the effect upon productivity of a
particular result, its consequence to the morale of the shop,
his judgment whether tensions will be heightened or
diminished. For the parties' objective in using the arbitration
process is primarily to further their common goal of
uninterrupted production under the agreement, to make the
agreement serve their specialized needs. The ablest judge
cannot be expected to bring the same experience and
competence to bear upon the determination of a grievance,
because he cannot be similarly informed.93
The differences between union and non-union workplaces are profound,
as are the distinctions between labor arbitration and employment arbitration.94
However, as is the case with its unionized counterpart, non-union employment
is a highly relational or intertwined exchange."' Consequently, employment
arbitrators will find themselves construing contracts in which incompleteness
is inevitable. If we assume the existence of a highly relational exchange, with
details to be filled in from outside the promissory language used by the parties,
the most obvious inquiry is: from whence will the detail emerge? Because
many sources exist, the answer is not simple.96
The preceding discussion demonstrates that certain structural elements are
in place for the development of contracts. Part IV of this Article addresses
those forces that arbitration will bring to bear upon the non-union employment
relationship and considers the types of specific contract terms that could
emerge as a result.
IV. ARBITRATION AS MIDWIFE TO THE BIRTH OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS

In a unionized workplace, the collective bargaining agreement sets forth

93. Id. at 582. The views of the Supreme Court in the Trilogy, as exemplified by the
quoted excerpt, have led to observations that the arbitrator is the parties' "joint alterego for the
purpose of striking whatever supplementary bargain is necessary to handle the anticipated
unanticipated omissions of the initial agreement." St. Antoine, supra note 54, at 1140.
94. See Craver, supra note 72 (analyzing the view that labor arbitration is an
extension of the collective bargaining process).
95. See Macneil, supra note 83, at 725. Professor Samuel Issacharoff has discussed
some of the inherent difficulties in establishing arelatively complete employment agreement and
has observed that the incompleteness of such a contract is particularly problematic because it
generally relates to two critical times in the "life-cycle [of the] relationship: at the formation of
the contract and at its final stages." Issacharoff, supra note 46, at 1786.
96. See Macneil, supra note 83, at 715.
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certainrestrictions on managerial discretion." While employers and employees
are not likely to articulate the nature of their relationship by utilizing
Hohfeldian terminology," they no doubt intuitively recognize that the contract
formally establishes and recognizes duties of employers and correlative rights
of employees. Collective bargaining agreements also include detailed
procedures that employees must follow to lodge formal complaints against their
employers, the usual form being a grievance procedure that culminates in
submission of unresolved disputes to a labor arbitrator. Thus, the collective
bargaining process results in the empowerment of unionized employees.
By simply agreeing to submit disputes to arbitration, employers of nonunion employees will not immediately empower their employees in a similar
fashion. However, as employment arbitration matures, the functional
equivalent of a contract will begin to emerge. With this development, nonunion employees will eventually obtain rights that are similar in kind, if not
degree, to those which unionized employees presently enjoy. These standards
will be procedural as well as substantive in nature. Let us consider the
procedural components first, because they will likely emerge prior to the
substantive rights.
A. EstablishmentofProceduralRegularity
Collective bargaining agreements provide detailed procedural guidelines
for the resolution of disputes through the grievance procedure, which can
culminate in arbitration. A non-union workplace, on the other hand, is more
likely to involve an ad hoc approach for dealing with problems in the
employer-employee relationship, and the approach will vary from one
employer to the next. Moreover, a wide array of options is available for those
non-union employers that do elect to formalize their methods of resolving
employment disputes. For non-union employers adopting arbitration, several
significant factors should drive the development of a somewhat homogenous
set of procedural standards governing dispute resolution.
1. Relational ContractPrinciples
From a theoretical perspective, some exchanges are largely transactional
or discrete, while others are much more relational or intertwined; employment
typifies what many would characterize as a highly relational contract
exchange.99 One of the principal tenets of relational contract theory is the belief

97. See, e.g., ARNOLD M. ZACK & RICHARD I. BLOCH, LABOR AGREEMENT IN
NEGOTIATION AND ARBITRATION 129-59 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing how collective bargaining
agreements limit managerial rights).
98. See WEsLEYNEWCOMBHOHFELD, FUNDAMENTALLEGAL CONCEFlONSAAPPLED

INJUDICIAL REASONING (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1964).
99. See infra Part.III.B.1.
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that only in regard to discrete exchanges are the parties able to more or less
completely "presentiate" or plan for all contingencies.' 0 As Professor Macneil
remarks, "[T]he participants [in a relational exchange] never intend or expect
to see the whole future of the relation as presentiated at any single time, but
view the relation as an ongoing integration of behavior which will grow and
vary with events in a largely unforeseeable future.... ."" One consequence of
this view is that the parties expect trouble or disputes as a normal part of their
relationship and, therefore, tend to place a strong emphasis on planning
processes for resolving problems.' 2
The adoption of arbitration in the non-union employment context is
understandable because employment is a highly relational activity that naturally
fosters the development of some kind of process for resolving disagreements
among its participants. Non-union employment presents an environment that
is receptive to procedural innovation and one that will likely produce a further
refinement of those procedures already in effect, because extensive planning
for dispute resolution is inherent with highly relational exchanges.' 3
2. JudicialMandates
Another significant consideration is that non-union employees will likely
base a substantial number of their "grievances" (to borrow terminology from
the union context) upon rights derived from statutes. Two factors explain the
eagerness of employers to adopt arbitration in the non-union context: (1) the
expansion of individual employee rights and the resultant "legalization" of the
workplace and (2) the strong endorsement of arbitration by the Supreme Court.
With regard to the latter, the Court has demonstrated a somewhat remarkable
deference to the arbitration of employee statutory claims, especially in recent
years, but that deference presupposes adherence to conditions established by
the Court. Because those conditions will necessarily lead to the establishment
of procedural standards, a brief overview of the Court's holdings is warranted.
In Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo.'° the United States Supreme Court
held that an employee who took a claim through arbitration pursuant to a
collective bargaining agreement was not precluded from pursuing a subsequent
federal lawsuit under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.' 5 "Commentators
understood Gardner-Denverand its progeny to establish a general rule that an
employee could litigate a statutory claim regardless of a contractual promise to

100. See Ian R. Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentiation,60
VA. L. REv. 589, 589 (1974).
101. Id. at 595.
102. See Macneil, supra note 83, at 786-90.
103. See id.

104. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
105. Id. at 59-60.
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arbitrate."' 6 Subsequently the Court held that employees with claims under the
Fair Labor Standards Act, 10 7 First Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983,"' and claims arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act0 9
could proceed with their suits, notwithstanding the prior arbitration of their
claims pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement.
For a number of decades, Gardner-Denverstood for the relatively simple
proposition that employees, as well as parties in other, non-employment
contexts, could not be compelled to arbitrate statutory claims."' With the socalled Mitsubishi Trilogy in the mid- to late-1980s, the Court allowed
compulsory arbitration of statutory claims based upon antitrust, securities, and
racketeering laws, thereby seriously undermining the Gardner-Denver
rationale."' On the heels of its "increasing confidence in arbitral resolution of
statutory claims,""' 2 the Court considered the issue of compulsory arbitration
in the case of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp."' The plaintiff in
Gilmer alleged his employer fired him because of his age which violated the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"). His employment
required him to register with the New York Stock Exchange, and the
registration application contained a clause by which Mr. Gilmer agreed to
compulsory arbitration of employment disputes." 4 Consistent with its reasoning
in the Mitsubishi Trilogy, the Court held that Gilmer's agreement entitled his
employer to compel arbitration of the ADEA claim. While the Gilmerdecision
involves complex issues that are beyond the scope of this Article, one aspect
of the decision, the focus on arbitration procedure, is directly relevant."'

106. Michael R. Holden, Note, Arbitrationof State-Law Claims by Employees: An
Argument for ContainingFederalArbitration Law, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1695, 1728 (1995)
(footnote omitted).
107. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
108. See McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
109. See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557 (1987).
110. See Holden, supra note 106, at 1728.
111. The three decisions comprising the Mitsubishi Trilogy are Rodriguez de Quias
v. Shearson/AmericanExpress, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989), Shearson/American Express Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987), and MitsubishiMotors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,Inc.,
473 U.S. 614 (1985). One commentator observes that "[t]he Supreme Court began reversing
years ofjudicial hostility to the arbitration of statutory rights in Mitsubishi Motors," and notes
that by the time it had decided the Rodriguez de Quijas case, 'Judicial skepticism toward
arbitration all but disappeared." Bedikian, supra note 31, at 131 n.124.
112. Bales, supra note 2, at 1885.
113. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
114. Id. at23.
115. The majority in Gilmer neatly sidestepped what many see as a crucial issue
relating to the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate employment disputes, that being the
question whether § I of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") literally excludes all employment
contracts from coverage under the Act. See Gilmer,500 U.S. at 25, n.2; see also Holden, supra
note 106 (commenting on compulsory arbitration and the FAA). But cf.Gilmer, 500 U.S. 36-41
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Given the uncertainty regarding the ultimate interpretation that the
Court will give to § 1, one cannot unequivocally assert that employment agreements to arbitrate
are enforceable under the FAA, or that they will be in the future. On the other hand, such
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Relying upon the reasoning of Gardner-Denver,,Mr. Gilmer quite
understandably attacked the arbitration process itself, claiming that its
informality made it inadequate to protect statutory employment rights. 1 6
Gilmer's arguments regarding the procedural inadequacies of arbitration
included claims of biased arbitration panels and insufficient discovery
opportunities for the parties, as well as claims that arbitrators would fail to
issue written opinions and that they would possess only limited remedial
authority." 7 The Court rejected each of Gilmer's claims, relying heavily upon
the arbitration rules of the New York Stock Exchange.1 8
While the Court affirmed its current endorsement of arbitration, the
endorsement is qualified. Implicit in Gilmeris the principle that the judiciary
will defer to arbitration only if the process does indeed adequately protect the
rights of employees. The lower federal courts and the state courts are clearly
attentive to this consideration and have been for a number of years pre-dating
Gilmer."'9 Employers cannot predict in advance whether an employee that
pursues a claim through arbitration will be asserting a statutory claim. The
reasonable and perhaps the only prudent strategy, then, is to design an
arbitration process with procedures that adequately protect employee rights;
otherwise, the finality of the decisions becomes problematic. Attorneys that
advise employers in planning for arbitration will, of course, be aware of this
issue and will counsel the adoption of tried-and-true processes with the end
result being a standardization of arbitration procedures.
Another factor that will tend to formalize non-union employment
arbitration and to compel compliance with a relatively uniform set of
procedural guidelines will be the necessity of having the proceedings comply
with statutory and regulatory guidelines. For example, the Uniform Arbitration
Act,'20 adopted by thirty-four states and the District of Columbia,'' establishes
procedures for the arbitration hearing,2' requires that parties have the right to
be represented by an attorney,"z grants the arbitrator authority to issue

enforcement is likely because ofthe Supreme Court's apparent inclinations orbecause Congress
could simply amend the FAA if the Court concludes that § 1 excludes all employment
agreements. In either case, one premise ofthis Article is that employment agreements to arbitrate
will be enforceable for the foreseeable future.
116. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28.
117. Id.at 30-33.

118. Id.
119. See,e.g., Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co., 467 F.2d 54,58 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding
that a court may defer to an arbitrator's decision only where Title VII Rights are protected);
Renny v. Port Huron Hosp., 398 N.W.2d 327, 329 (Mich. 1986) (stating that an arbitrator's
decision "shall be final unless the court finds as a matter of law that the procedures used did not
comport with elementary fairness").
120. UNIF. ARBITRATION AcT, 7 U.L.A. 1 (1997).
121. Id.at 1.
122. Id.§ 5.
123. Id. § 6. Section 6 also states that a waiver of the right to representation prior to
the hearing is ineffective. See id.
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subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the production of "books,
records, 25documents and other evidence,"' 24 and requires that awards be in
writing.1
3. ExternalPressures
Although the judicial system's insistence uponprocedural protocol is alone
sufficient to move the adoption ofstandard arbitration procedures, other matters
related to the alternative dispute resolution system will also contribute to the
establishment of procedural regularity. These include the publicized opinions
of academics and other non-partisan observers of the employment relationship,
as well as arbitrators and employment law practitioners, who express views
regarding the need to extend procedural fairness to non-union employees in the
arbitration process. "
Considered in combination, the adhesive nature of a compulsory arbitration
agreement and the fact that the assigned employee must face the employer
without the support of a union have attracted widespread criticism.' As a
consequence, some commentators have simply rejected compulsory arbitration
as inherently unfair, and even those who generally embrace the Supreme
Court's endorsement of arbitration, as exemplified by the reasoning in Gihner,
are more often than not quick to preach the necessity of procedural protection
for employees.'28 The use of mandatory arbitration has created a lively

124. Id. § 7(a).
125. Id. § 8(a).
126. See, e.g., Mark Berger, Can Employment Law Arbitration Work?, 61 UMKC L.
REv. 693 (1993) (noting various procedural concerns).
127. Focusing on only two principal objections to employment arbitration might
suggest that the substitution of arbitration for litigation before a court or governmental agency
is a simpler question than it really is. Numerous policy considerations are implicated by such a
move and, consequently, attentiveness to the two objections singled out will hardly resolve all
of the concerns. However, the more comprehensive criticisms of arbitration support the call for
an expansion ofprocedural rights and a more rigorous application ofsubstantive law. For some
of the more penetrating and insightful analyses ofthose areas in need of attention see id.; Edward
Brunet, ArbitrationandConstitutionalRights, 71 N.C. L. REV.81 (1992); Brunet, supra note 62,
at 31; Estreicher, supra note 61.
128. See, for example, Estreicher, supra note 61, at 796, where Professor Estreicher
notes:
[P]rivate arbitrators who sit to dispense public justice
will be subject to the due process requirements that
govern any form of public adjudication. In the
American legal culture, this will, of necessity, result
in increasing levels of formality that reduce whatever
advantages of speed and informality arbitration
traditionally has enjoyed. It is doubtful that a doctrine
of stare decisis can be successfully resisted, simply to
ensure that statutory norms are being applied-here,
as an exercise of direct governmental authority rather
than through the filter of a private contract-in a

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol50/iss1/6

32

Moller: Birth of Contract: Arbitration in the Non-Union Workplace

1998]

ARBITRATION IN THE NON-UNION WORKPLACE

controversy, the focus of which is perhaps most clearly visible in the spirited
debates thathave led to the adoption of "protocols" by influential players in the
arbitration establishment.
A specially appointed national committee focused on the debate in its
Report and Recommendations of the Commission on the Future of WorkerManagement Relations ("Report"), first released in 1994. The Report declares
that, to assure accuracy and fairness, private arbitration systems must provide
the following:
*
*

"

*
*
*
*

a neutral arbitrator who knows the laws in question and
understands the concerns of the parties;
a fair and simple method by which the employee can
secure the necessary information to present his or her
claim;
a fair method of cost-sharing between the employer and
employee to ensure affordable access to the system for
all employees;
the right to independent representation if the employee
wants it;
a range of remedies equal to those available through
litigation;
a written opinion by the arbitrator explaining the rationale for
the result; and
sufficient judicial review to ensure that the result is
consistent with the governing laws.'29

The Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations was
somewhat ambivalent on the question of the legal enforceability of an
employee's agreement to arbitrate, concluding that "private arbitration systems
... will have to prove themselves through experience before the nation is in a
position to decide whether employers should be allowed to require their
employees to use them as a condition of employment."' 3 Others have been less
acquiescent. For example, both the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and the National Labor Relations Board have opposed the use of
mandatory arbitration agreements in certain situations,' and "[t]he National
Employment Lawyers Association (NELA) ... threatened to boycott the
American Arbitration Association . . . over [the issue of] mandatory

relatively evenhanded and doctrinally coherent

manner.
129. See BNA, REPORTAND RECOMMENDATIONSOFTHE COMMISSIONONTHEFUTURE

OFWORKER-MANAGEMENTRELATIONS § IV.3, at 31 (1995), reprintedin 6 Daily Lab. Rep. Doc.

55 (Jan. 10, 1995).
130. Id. § IV.2.
131. See William K. Slate II, Out-of-CourtResolution of Employment Disputes,215
N.Y.L.J. 3 (1996).
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arbitration.' ' 1 2 Discontent with mandatory arbitration extends to groups that
ordinarily do not focus on employment matters. 33 Even arbitrators themselves
appear to disagree over such issues. For example, an ongoing dialogue within
the most prestigious and exclusive organization of labor arbitrators, the
National Academy of Arbitrators, reveals a deep division in that body,
evidencedby its refusal to admit employment arbitrators into its membership.3 4
Partially in response to the threatened NELA boycott, and presumably
because of its own concerns over the fairness of mandatory arbitration, the
American Arbitration Association convened aNational Employment Conclave
in September 1995 "to address current issues in the application of employment
dispute resolution procedures for contracts of employment, personnel manuals
and employee handbooks."' 35 The Association endorsed "A Due Process
Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of the
Employment Relationship"'3 6 ("Due Process Protocol"), in which a special task
force recommended due process standards. This Due Process Protocol is quite
detailed and demonstrates a zeal for extending to non-union employees
procedural rights comparable to those enjoyed by union employees in the labor
arbitration process. The extent to which the Due Process Protocol guarantees
employees' rights is evidenced by the political diversity of the groups that have
endorsed it. These groups include "the American Bar Association Labor and
Employment Section, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service, the National Academy
of Arbitrators and
37
the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution."'
In May of 1996, the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") issued
new National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes ("National
Rules"), reflecting the guidelines outlined in the Due Process Protocol.'38 These
National Rules are based on "the AAA's California Employment Dispute
Resolution Rules, which were developed by a committee of [persons
representing diverse interests]."' 39 In 1998, the AAA provided a practical guide

132. Id. at 3-4.

133. See, e.g., Kaufman &Underwood, supra note 2, at 48 ("Civil-rights groups like
the NAACP and the National Organization for Women see a sinister plot afoot.").
134. See Denenberg & Denenberg, supra note2, at49 (reflecting upon the Academy's
wrangles over the issue and its 1993 refusal "to expand its constitutional statement of purpose
to cover 'those engaged in the arbitration oflabor-management andemployment [i.e., non-union]
disputes on a professional basis') (quoting Anthony V. Sinicropi, Presidential Address: The
Future of Labor Arbitration: Problems, Prospects, and Opportunities (May 27-31,1992), in
ARBITRATION 1992 IMPROVING ARBITRAL AND ADVOCACY SKILLS, 1993, at 1-20).
135. See Slate, supra note 131, at 4.
136. Id.
137. Agnes J. Wilson, Resolution ofEmployment Disputes, 217 N.Y.L.J. 3 (1997).
138. American Arbitration Association Releases New National Rules for the
Resolution ofEmployment Disputesto EnsureDue Process,Adhere to Protocol,NEws RELEASE
(American Arbitration Ass'n, New York, N.Y.), May 21, 1996, at 1-2.
139. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N, RESOLVING EMPLOYMENT DIsPUTES: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE 3 (1998).
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for employers in developing ADR procedures to resolve workplace disputes,
noting that "[d]ue process safeguards are critical to any employment dispute
resolution program because they ensure a fair and equitable forum for both
employee and employer."'" In that guide, the Association provided a checklist
to aid employment arbitration program drafters.''
Finally, in addition to the many external pressures, one must consider the
impact of the participants in the process. While it seems clear that an
employee's right to counsel will be a required due process safeguard, 42
attorneys accustomed to procedural rights will likely press for innovations and
regularity in the arbitration context. Moreover, one can anticipate that
employment arbitrators will be recruited from the ranks of labor arbitrators.

140. Id. at I.
141. See id.at 8-12. Although reproducing the entire checklist would be too lengthy,
the subject headings capture the essential coverage of the checklist, as well as the range of issues
covered by both the National Rules and the Due-Process Protocol, because the checklist is
reflective of those governing documents:
Include a fair method of cost-sharing between the
employer and employee to ensure affordable access
to the system for all employees.
Use a neutral ADR provider and an established, fair
procedure to govern the arbitration.
Specify the qualifications and number of arbitrators.
Specify the employees to be covered.
Specify the nature of the claims to be covered.
Give employees clear notice of their right of
representation.
Provide time frames for filing a claim that are
consistent with applicable statutes of limitation.
Provide for fair and adequate discovery.
Allow for the same remedies and relief that would
have been available to the parties had the matter been
heard in court ....
State clearly that it does not preclude an employee from filing a complaint
with a federal, state or other governmental administrative agency ....
Provide adequate notice to employees prior to the plan implementation.
Ensure that the employment ADR plan is written in a
clear and easily understood manner.
Id.
142. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N, NATIONAL RULES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF
EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES (INCLUDING MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION RULES) 18 (1998).
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Labor arbitrators' familiarity with the procedural rights for employees, as set
forth in collective bargaining agreements, and their regular observation of such
practices in labor arbitration proceedings, will naturally influence the manner
in which they conduct employment arbitration hearings.
Ultimately, these factors will result in a heightened sensitivity to the
procedural rights of employees, which will lead to the establishment of
procedural regularity for employment arbitration. When a clear demarcation of
the boundaries of what is acceptable or required with regard to procedural
rights becomes apparent, a relatively homogenous set of standards is likely to
ensue. While one may not initially perceive this development as creating the
functional equivalent of contract rights for individual employees, upon
reflection this would seem to be the case. If mandatory arbitration compels
employers to comply with certain procedural standards, then the procedural
aspects will become, in essence, implied terms of the employer-employee
agreement.
One interesting effect of such a development is that extending procedural
rights to employees will have ramifications reaching beyond those cases that
proceed to arbitration. Arbitrators will be inclined to consider whether
employers afforded their employees due process at each stage of their
interaction. As such, the non-union employer will discover the reality of what
may be termed a "de facto contract," even in situations that do not proceed to
arbitration. Because employers will be unable to anticipate which employment
disputes will culminate in arbitration, it will be necessary either to comply with
certain duties essentially as if they were set forth in contract or risk having an
arbitrator overturn their personnel decisions.
Numerous factors will likely bring about a relatively extensive and detailed
array of procedural rights for employees whose employers opt for arbitration.
While this in itself would be a noteworthy phenomenon, the potential
development of substantive duties and rights present an equally intriguing
scenario.
B. Creation and Growth of SubstantiveRights
The "Birth of Contract" reference in this Article's title indicates a
presupposition that no contract presently exists for non-union employees, but
that would overstate its position to some extent because certain technical
attributes of a contract already govern the relationship between employers and
their non-union employees. However, these contracts are typically quite
rudimentary with regard to both the breadth and the depth of their coverage.
Therefore, agreements to submit workplace disputes to arbitration do have the
potential for effectuating fundamental change if they result in contract terms
becoming greatly elaborated and otherwise enhanced. Thus, employment
arbitration will play midwife to the birth of contract.
While many have made urgent pleas over the past few decades to extend
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rights ofjob security to employees,'43 employers have been impervious to these
pressures due largely to the employment-at-will doctrine. That barrier is no

longer impenetrable, but it remains intact, perhaps even more so than some
employers realize.44 A number of factors related to employment arbitration will
in effect open the gate, allowing the principle of employee job security to take
hold in the form of contract terms 4or
their finctional equivalent. These factors
5
are discussed later in this Article.
1.

Opening the Gate Wide: Framingthe Issuefor Arbitration

When a dispute under a collective bargaining agreement proceeds to labor
arbitration, a fundamental concern for the parties is how to frame the issue
submitted to the arbitrator. Employers typically prefer an issue that is narrow

in scope, which restricts the arbitrator to a particular contract provision, and
sometimes negotiate specific contract terms restricting the arbitrator's
authority.' The objective is to preclude decisions based on a generalized
notion of justice or fairness, which would impose duties upon the employer in
addition to those set forth in the contract. 47
What about framing the issue for arbitration in the non-union context?
Presumably, non-union employers, like their union counterparts, will attempt
to frame the issue such that an arbitrator is not free to "invent" duties or
obligations. On the other hand, if employers wish to avoid litigation and assure
the finality of the arbitration decision, the arbitrator must be given the authority
to adjudicate claims relating to any and all legal rights of an aggrieved
employee. 41 If the issue before an employment arbitrator is whether the

143. See, e.g., Blades, supra note 24 (discussing the imbalance of power in an
employment-at-will relationship and the need for procedural protections); Summers, supranote
24 (noting the need for employee protection against unjust dismissal).
144. See Sid L. Moller, The Revolution That Wasn't: On the Business as Usual
Aspects of Employment at Will, 27 U. RICH. L. REv. 441 (1993) (observing that the exceptions
to the employment-at-will doctrine may not have as profound an impact as some may think).
145. See infra Part IV.B.5.
146. See ELKOURI & ELKOURi, supra note 40, at 125-28, 320-24 (regarding the
statement of the issue and the scope of arbitration).
147. See, e.g., id. at 886 (noting that arbitrators may read a "just cause" firing
requirement into a collective agreement that fails to expressly address this issue).
148. Lawyers tend to have a myopic view, seeing the world from a law-centered
perspective. As such, lawyers sometimes have a lack of appreciation for competing views. One
example is the notion that non-union employment arbitration is more akin to a resolution of
intra-family squabbles than an adjudication ofclaims based on legal entitlements. Theoretically,
a third party might be called in to calm the waters of a troubled relationship, without exalting the
parties' claims to a legal status in the process. See Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry,
Lessonsfrom the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 424,431 (1986).
However, as a practical matter, such a non-legal approach is incompatible with employment
arbitration. The legal focus is obvious with regard to the arbitration of statutory claims; but even
with regard to other grievances, a contractual agreement to submit claims to a neutral third party
for binding resolution, and because the arbitrator's decision is legally enforceable, will
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employer has violated a legal right of the employee, it follows that arbitrators
will be scrutinizing employee claims that are based on legislation as well as
those based on the common law.
The significance of styling the issue in such an open-ended fashion is
apparent. While labor arbitrators must determine whether a particular provision
(or a relatively small number of provisions) of a collective bargaining
agreement has been breached, employment arbitrators will have more
discretionary authority. Legal developments outside the boundaries of the
particular workplace may be implicated. Considering the non-union
employment relationship and its traditional governance by self-enforcing norms
rather than explicit rules, one discovers employment arbitration will involve
more than disputes over particular contractual provisions. This fact could
compel employers to clearly articulate contract terms. Note the rationale behind
such a move as explained by the following excerpt:
Assuming that contract's greater ability to bind motivates
the choice between norms and contract, why does there seem
to be a bipolar distribution of solutions, in both the ILM
[internal labor market] and commercial contexts? Why are
commercial relational contracts so detailed? Why is there
such a sharp distinction between the unwritten and
unenforceable non-union ILM and the detailed CBA
[collective bargaining agreement] of the union ILM?
The best explanation for the bipolar choice between
norms and contracts is the similarly bipolar choice between
self-enforcement and third party enforcement. Once it is
worthwhile to the parties to write a contract, for whatever
reason (to protect sunk investments in the power plant/coal
mine context, to bind the untrustworthy employer, or to
pursue union wage premia in an ILM), they must try to write
contracts that are as explicit as possible. By opting for third
party enforcement and thereby foregoing the benefits of a
self-enforcing norm-governed interaction, the parties expose
themselves to third party error and opportunistic behavior.
The two available mechanisms for minimizing this
vulnerability are, first, the choice of the third party
decisionmaker (that is, providing for expert arbitration), and,
second, detailed terms to guide the decisionmaker. Not
surprisingly, one finds these provisions in both long-term
49
commercial relational contracts and union CBAs. 1

necessarily confer a legal status on the rights and duties that emerge from the proceedings.
149. Rock & Wachter, supra note 16, at 1946.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol50/iss1/6

38

1998]

Moller: Birth of Contract: Arbitration in the Non-Union Workplace
ARBITRATION IN THE NON-UNION WORKPLACE

Compelling an employer to adopt a detailed employment contract in order to
guide the arbitrator supports this Article's thesis that employment arbitration
will lead to the emergence of contract. For a host of reasons, many employers
will likely choose not to pursue this option. In that case, other factors will come
into play, as the entire world of employment law jurisprudence is the
arbitrator's oyster. 5 0
2. Arbitration ofStatutory Claims
One cannot claim that employment arbitration will create statutory rights.
On the other hand, when an arbitrator scrutinizes an employer's statutory
duties, the arbitrator will probably incorporate the statutory duties by reference
into the employment contract. In this scenario, the statutory obligations take on
the functional equivalence of contractual duties. Even if the substance of the
statutory and contractual rights is largely redundant, the process of "activating"
statutory rights through arbitration is significant. One ramification of this
process is the availability of an alternative forum for employees, one that is
more accessible than a government agency or the court system.' Other factors
could also be of some consequence, such as the manner in which employment
arbitrators tend to fashion remedies as compared to that of administrative
agencies and the courts, and the extent to which courts ultimately defer to the
decisions of employment arbitrators.
Although having arbitrators determine whether an employer has violated
the statutory rights of employees is a notable development, the resolution of

150. The guidelines issued by the American Arbitration Association support the
assertion that arbitrators will be given an expansive charge to hear employee claims. In a recent

publication, the AAA states the following:
Under the National Rules for the Resolution of
Employment Disputes, the arbitrator may grant any

remedy or relief that the arbitrator deems just and
equitable, including any remedy or relief that would

have been available to the parties had the matter been
heard in court. This authority includes the right to

award compensatory and exemplary (or punitive)
damages, attorneys' fees, and other remedies to the
extent those remedies would be available under
applicable law in court. The National Rules for the
Resolution of Employment Disputes do not permit
programs to place restrictions on available remedies.
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N, supra note 139, at 11.

151. One commentator notes that labor arbitration is well accepted by unions and
union members, in part because "[i]t provides an informal environment and process that
employees understand." Fitzgibbon, supra note 2, at 488. Although Fitzgibbon directs these

comments to labor arbitration, a similar comfort level might be expected in the non-union
context. Fitzgibbon also notes that cost is an important factor for non-union employees: "[I]f
the majority of discharged at-will employees infact could not afford to go to court but could
obtain an effective decision in arbitration, any exhortation of the virtues of the judicial process
might be meaningless." Id. at 499.
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disputes involving common law rights is more likely to alter dramatically the
present status quo of the non-union employment relationship. Rights extended
to employees through legislation constitute something of a known quantity. But
common law rights, especially exceptions to the employment-at-will rule, have
rapidly expanded over the past couple of decades, and this area of the law
remains largely unsettled.
3. Relational ContractPrinciplesand the Common Law Rights of
Employees
Earlier, this Article explained the basis for a belief that the principles of
relational contract theory are helpful in analyzing employment agreements. 1S2
Professor Peter Linzer's work'53 is further support for the usefulness of nontraditional contract theory in explaining modem employment law. Professor
Linzer's general focus is on the blurring of the traditional divisions of private
law (tort, contract, and property law in particular), but specifically as
manifested in the context of employment law. 4 His analysis of the origins of
rights and duties in the workplace leads to his conclusion that:
[P]rivate law is a relatively seamless area in which the
society, speaking primarily through the courts, assigns rights
and duties based on relationships among people and firms, in
light of many factors, among them the particular community
needs, the needs of the parties themselves, their relative
power, fairness among them and their assent. The traditional
tort-contract-property lines are not irrelevant, and work fairly
well in simple situations (which may be very important).
They are close to useless when we are talking about a
relationship that is complex and that changes over a long
time. 55
Consistent with his theme that private law demarcations are blurred in the
employment context, Professor Linzer concludes that courts draw upon a blend
of tort, contract, and property law principles when defining the terms that
govern the employment relationship.IS6 Additionally, he points out that classical
contract law has evolved to reflect the current recognition of broad public
interests in the contracts arena, rather than the strictly private concerns of
another era. 7

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

See supra Part II.B.1.
See Linzer, supra note 12.
Id. at 356.
Id. at 326-27 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 425.
Id. at 379.
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Professor Linzer's views have a great deal of merit, at least insofar as he
describes what is actually occurring in these cases. Courts have been
increasingly receptive to the view that a contract between an employee and
employer is not limited to those matters upon which the parties have expressly
agreed.'

Several sources contribute to the establishment of employer duties

and employee rights, the most significant being norms of conduct and party
expectations. Moreover, courts also appear receptive to the view that, in a

highly relational situation, the rights and duties of the parties are not static;
instead, they are openly adjusted throughout the relationship.' s9
One might question the significance or even the relevance of court
decisions that impose contractual obligations upon employers, despite the lack

158. See, e.g., id. at 363 (discussing the Court's willingness to read a property right
to a job into an employment contract absent an explicit term).
159. One commentator observes:
While well-constructed contractual voluntarism may
be sufficient for common-law evaluation of earlystage employment relations, it is insufficient for the
evolving employment relation. The life-cycle model
of employment presents shifting relations between
employer and employee. As Schwab properly notes,
the incentives and risks operating on the parties
change precipitously across this relationship.
Issacharoff, supranote 58, at 1797 (citing Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice:Accomodating
Just Causeand Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REv. 8,38-51 (1993)). The following excerpt
is also relevant to this discussion:
But contrary to this "discrete transaction model,"
most transactions today involve long-term dealings
between parties who continue to have contact with
each other over the years. These are "contractual
relations," in which the needs of the parties will
change with external circumstances. Yet in the
"classical" (i.e., Williston) and "neoclassical" (i.e.,
Corbin) models of contract, the parties must address
all those needs, consciously and consensually, at the
moment the contract is made. All future
contingencies must be drawn back to the
present-they must be "presentiated." The parties
must deal with changes after the moment of
contracting by later mutual agreement, or else the
courts must use the cumbersome devices of excuse,
such as for mistake or impracticability. Otherwise the
terms presentiated at the time of contracting, perhaps
years in the past, must govern. Macneil proposes a
"relational" approach that will permit the rights and
duties of the parties to be openly adjusted during the
relationship. Other important writers on contracts
have accepted aspects of Macneil's relational
analysis, and have used its approach to deal with
changes in long-term promissory arrangements.
Linzer, supra note 12, at 392-93 (footnotes omitted).
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of an express agreement between the parties, where the controversy is subject
to arbitration rather than judicial review. Nevertheless, if arbitrators have the
duty to recognize any legal rights that an employee has in a particular
jurisdiction, then arguably the arbitrator must engage in an analysis which
parallels that of the courts within the pertinent jurisdiction. Thus, if the
arbitrator believes that a state's courts would prohibit an employer from
discharging an employee for reasons violative of public policy, then the
arbitrator is bound to rule against an employer that has committed such a
violation. The same holds true for the other principal exceptions to the
employment-at-will rule; namely, the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing and those obligations that arise from a so-called "implied contract."
The fact that an exception to the employment-at-will rule might find its way
into the non-union employment relationship as the functional equivalent of a
contractual term of employment warrants a closer look at how an employment
arbitrator should handle those exceptions. 6 '
4. Exceptions to the Employment-At-Will Rule
Although the analytical constructs adopted by courts that have recognized
exceptions to the employment-at-will rule are beyond the scope of this Article,
the reasoning of one court in a landmark decision illustrates how employment
arbitrators could recognize employer duties and employee rights in
circumstances that some employers, at least, will find surprising. In Toussaint
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield 6' the Michigan Supreme Court dealt with the
question of whether an employment handbook constituted an employment
contract that obligated the employer to comply with its terms. The handbook
provided that employees could be terminated only forjust cause. In concluding
that the employer had indeed assumed such an obligation, the court reasoned
as follows:
While an employer need not establish personnel policies

160. Although the lines have been blurred, as noted by Professor Linzer, see Linzer,
supranote 12, the right to challenge a discharge because it violates public policy is commonly
characterized as an action in tort rather than contract. See Moller, supranote 144, at 471-78, 481.
While not minimizing the importance of the distinction, intuition leads one to believe that the
characterization of a discharge as either a tortious act or a contractual breach will ultimately be
of lesser significance in arbitration. When employment arbitrators adjudicate claims based on
allegations that the employer violated public policy, their mode of analysis will remain
essentially the same, however the claim is styled. Although the employer's obligations will be
derived from policies that are extraneous to the employment relationship, the dispositive
question will be whether the employer breached a duty it owed to the employee. Accordingly,
one might characterize the obligation as the equivalent of an implied contractual duty such that
employers cannot discharge employees for reasons violative of public policy. In that case, the
only meaningful difference between characterizing the action as one in tort or as one in contract
will relate to the issue of remedies.
161. 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980).
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or practices, where an employer chooses to establish such
policies and practices and makes them known to its
employees, the employment relationship is presumably
enhanced. The employer secures an orderly, cooperative and
loyal work force, and the employee the peace of mind
associated with job security and the conviction that he will be
treated fairly. No pre-employment negotiations need take
place and the parties' minds need not meet on the subject; nor
does it matter that the employee knows nothing of the
particulars of the employer's policies and practices or that the
employer may change them unilaterally. It is enough that the
employer chooses, presumably in its own interest, to create an
environment in which the employee believes that, whatever
the personnel policies and practices, they are established and
official at any given time, purport to be fair, and are applied
consistently and uniformly to each employee. The employer
62
has then created a situation "instinct with an obligation."'
Consider the ramifications of the Toussaintrationale. What circumstances
create a workplace relationship "instinct with an obligation" to terminate
employees only for just cause? This standard is vague, much different than the
requirements of classical contract doctrine.1 63 Under the standard articulated in
Toussaint,one could plausibly argue that the employer creates such a situation
by agreeing to arbitrate employment disputes. At the very least, injurisdictions
that have adopted the implied contract exception, arbitrators will have the
license to scrutinize the history of an employment relationship in search of
words and actions that establish a voluntary assumption of duties by the
employer. Similar reasoning would apply to the other exceptions to the
employment-at-will rule. Unfortunately, discerning which employee discharges
are offensive to "public policy" and the type of circumstances that will
constitute a violation of the employer's implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing will most likely be problematic.
All three exceptions to the employment-at-will rule are flexible, which
provides decision makers with a tremendous amount of latitude. While this
Article notes that exceptions provide the theoretical justifications necessary to
eviscerate the employment-at-will doctrine, commentators also recognize that
because the standards are so indefinite they could be interpreted narrowly so

162. Id. at 892 (footnote omitted) (quoting Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff Gordon, 118
N.E. 214,214 (N.Y. 1917)).
163. Regarding the Toussaint decision, Professor Linzer states that "[w]hat appears
to be a somewhat loose construction of an offer and acceptance really reflects a major change
in the substantive law of employment relations." Linzer, supra note 12, at 349. Additionally,
Professor Linzer accurately identifies the court's rationale as "heresy as far as traditional contract
law is concerned." Id. at 351.
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as to disallow only the most egregious actions of employers.'6 In essence, the
exceptions present courts with an opportunity to make policy determinations.
If employment arbitrators have the same opportunity, the exceptions could
accommodate a broad expansion of employee rights. Over time, arbitrators
possibly could apply the exceptions to the employment-at-will rule in a manner
that would transform the non-union employment relationship.
Implicit in the preceding explanation is the assumption that arbitrators are
prone to make policy determinations that are more favorable to employees than
to employers; that is, they are likely to "push the envelope" by a broad
application of the employment-at-will exceptions. This assumption may be
suspect because a substantial percentage of arbitrators will undoubtedly be
hesitant to assume an activist or creative role. If nothing else, the need to
maintain acceptability would contribute to moderation in this regard. However,
under close analysis of the institution of labor arbitration and some of its more
notable traditions, the likelihood of an expansive view of employer duties and
employee rights becomes apparent.
5. ArbitrationTraditionsand Practices
While unionized employees almost invariably enjoy protection from
discharge without cause, non-union employees typically do not enjoy such
protection. Nevertheless, non-union employees have been the beneficiaries of
numerous other legal protections in the past two or three decades as a result of
legislative and common law developments. But, for the most part, these
developments do not amount to contract rights, and, therefore, the models of
governance for unionized and non-unionized relationships remain
fundamentally different. Assuming that some substantive contract rights
emerge as a consequence of employment arbitration, perhaps the most
compelling question is whether a discharge-for-cause-only obligation, or
something comparable, will evolve. Given the conventions of labor arbitration,
and the likelihood that such conventions will influence the thinking of
of enhanced job
employment arbitrators, a move toward the development
65
security rights for non-union employees seems probable.

164. See Moiler, supra note 144, at 481-82. Although Moller's article makes
reference to only two of the exceptions, the principle stated has application to all three.
165. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted a
Model Employment Termination Act in 1991 which provides employees certain rights of job
security and utilizes arbitration as the principal enforcement mechanism. See Theodore J. St.
Antoine, TheMaking ofthe ModelEmployment TerminationAct, 69 WASH. L. Rv. 361,369-70,
376-78 (1994). As the reporter for the committee that proposed that law, Professor St. Antoine
wrote, "Adopting the arbitration format would immediately make available the vast body of
arbitral precedent concerning substance and procedure that has been developed in countless
decisions over the years." St. Antoine, supra note 23, at 77. Professor St. Antoine's statement
may not apply equally to the at-will situation when a statute is not involved, but his insights are
significant, even if they only lead us to conclude that one cannot realistically expect "the vast
body of arbitral precedent" to be ignored by employment arbitrators. For further insight, see
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As explained, the employment-at-will rule essentially established the terms
of an employment agreement by default, because if the parties had no explicit
understanding of contractual restrictions on the employer's discretion, then a
court would conclude that none existed. This judicial mindset is significant to
the analysis of decisions in which the courts have adopted or applied
exceptions to the employment-at-will rule. Limiting employer discretion
constitutes a disturbance of the status quo and, in many jurisdictions, a dramatic
departure from long-observed norms. Consequently, employees often only
obtain legal relief when the actions of their employers are egregious. The
tradition of labor arbitration is in some regards exactly the opposite. The
conventional approach of labor arbitrators is such thatjob security is presumed
and employer actions that threaten such security are closely scrutinized. A
couple of examples will illustrate this close scrutinization.
Subcontracting, which in the context of the present discussion means the
transfer of work normally performed by bargaining unit employees to the
employees of another employer, is sometimes an extremely contentious matter
in unionized environments. 66 Questions regarding the employer's discretion to
subcontract are not uncommon in labor arbitration. 67 The situation in which the
contract is silent on the issue is especially problematic. On this point, the
reasoning of one highly regarded labor arbitrator is illuminating:
Job security is an inherent element of the labor contract, a
part of its very being. If wages is the heart of the labor
agreement, job security may be considered its soul. Those
eligible to share in the degree of job security the contract
affords are those to whom the contract applies.....
The transfer of work customarily performed by
employees in the bargaining unit to others outside the unit
Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panaceaor Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV.
668 (1986). Judge Edwards explains:
In other areas, we could capitalize on the
substantive expertise and standards developed by
well-established ADR mechanisms. For example, the
experience and standards developed through decades
of labor arbitration and mediation could prove
particularly useful in settling disputes between
nonunionized employees and their employers in cases
of "unjust dismissal." Labor arbitrators have
developed fine-tuned standards for just-cause
terminations, which they could easily transfer to the
nonunion workplace, thus providing similar
protection to nonunion employees.
Id. at 681 (footnote omitted).
166. See, e.g., New Britain Mach. Co. v. United Elec. Workers, Local 207, 8 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 720 (1947) (Wallen, Arb.) (arbitrating a dispute arising from the transfer of
watchmen duties from union members to non-union guards).
167. See id.
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must therefore be regarded as an attack on the job security of
the employees whom the agreement covers and therefore on
one of the contract's basic purposes. 6 '
Collective bargaining agreements that contain no express limitation on the
right of the employer to discharge employees present a similar issue. In How
ArbitrationWorks, 69 a familiar reference publication for labor arbitrators, the
authors point out that although some arbitrators are unwilling to read a justcause limitation into the contract, many others take the opposite position,
concluding that absent a clear provision to the contrary, it must be implied that
employers are restricted to just-cause discharges.'70 Interpreting the labor
agreement otherwise would reduce to a nullity the fundamental notion of
workers' security in their jobs. 7'
Much more could be said regarding both the prominent status of job
security in the labor arbitrator's hierarchy of values and of the significant role
that the protection against abusive or arbitrary discharge plays in the analytical
framework of labor arbitration decisions. These points demonstrate that, on this
particular issue, the labor arbitration decision-making process is fundamentally
different from that of the courts. Whereas the "default contract" for courts has
historically been one of employment at will, the absence of explicit contract
directives does not preclude labor arbitrators from imposing restrictions on
employer discretion. Due to labor arbitrators placing such a high value on
employee job security, employers in labor arbitration cases cannot confidently
assume that they have the freedom to discharge employees unless they have
successfully negotiated explicit contract terms to that effect.
Because labor arbitration involves a collective bargaining agreement that
almost invariably includes a just-cause provision and because it presents any
number of distinguishing policy considerations as compared to the non-union
situation, it would be understandable if the reader discounts the significance of
the tendencies noted above. However, one should not be too quick to dismiss
labor arbitration as a "wholly-other" endeavor. As explained earlier, the courts
have articulated standards in the recognized exceptions to the employment-atwill rule that are not self-defining, which means the decision maker will have
some latitude in determining whether a contract exists. Consider again the
specific example of the implied contract exception. Also, recall the Toussaint
court's focus on the reasonable expectations of employees and its conclusion
that the situation was "instinct with an obligation."'' It seems apparent that
those conversant with the values and conventions of labor arbitration will have
some proclivity toward applying such a pliant standard as that presented by the

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 722.
ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 40.
Id. at 884-86.
Id. at 886.
Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917).
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implied contract exception in a manner that recognizes job security for
employees. 73 Echoing a point made earlier, the same could be said for the
determination of whether discharges are violative of public policy or are in
contravention of the employer's good faith and fair dealing obligation.
Employers of non-union employees may seek to avoid using labor
arbitrators because of a concern that the labor arbitrators will indiscriminately
import principles from the union context into the non-union environment.
Employers may partially succeed with this objective, especially if they are
relatively sophisticated in their arbitrator selection process, but it will be a
surprise if one is able to read a number of employment arbitration decisions in
twenty years and not see the influence of labor arbitration in the decision
makers' thought processes.
The impact of labor arbitration will likely be attributable to many factors
and will likely surface in a multitude of situations, such as: the reasoning
articulated by experienced labor arbitrators who cannot completely separate
labor arbitration from employment arbitration; the non-discriminate borrowing
of labor arbitration principles by inexperienced arbitrators who do not fully
appreciate the differences between union and non-union contractual relations;
the thoughtful analysis of arbitrators who reason by analogy to labor arbitration
decisions because no other precedent is quite apropos to the case at hand; and
the slanted rationalizations by arbitrators who, although designated as
"neutrals," are in fact thinly veiled partisans who aggressively support the
expansion of employee rights. It will be impossible to establish employee
arbitration as an entirely separate institution, altogether immune from the
influences of labor arbitration. At least some of the traditions, norms,
precedents, analytical constructs, and even the personalities involved with labor
arbitration, will inevitably surface in employment arbitration. 74
Many of the influences mentioned previously will result in the
development of detailed contractual agreements in the non-union context.
Consider the following hypothetical. Assume that an employer is doing
business in a state that recognizes the implied contract exception to the
employment-at-will rule, and further that an employment arbitrator has
concluded that certain representations of the employer have created a situation
in which employees reasonably expect that they will be discharged for cause
only. If the arbitrator reinstates an employee fired for theft because in the past
the employer had not fired other employees who had stolen property and also
because the employee in question had a spotless record prior to his infraction,
then the arbitrator is borrowing principles from labor arbitration that have

173. Ironically, at least from the employer's viewpoint, some arbitrators might
conclude that providing for the arbitration of disputes creates some level of contractual job
security for employees.
174. See generally Fitzgibbon, supra note 2, at 500-16 (providing insight into the
arbitrator's approach to dispute resolution and highlighting several customs of the labor
arbitration process that likely viii find their way into non-union employment arbitration).
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evolved over the years in discharge cases. While the employer in this instance
has neither negotiated a contract with its employees whereby it assumes
contractual duties nor unilaterally promulgated an employee handbook that
obligates it to follow certain procedures in discharge cases, the arbitrator's
decision will in some regards establish similar duties.
In the foregoing hypothetical, suppose that the employer's CEO is advised
of the arbitrator's decision. After being educated on the principles ofjust-cause
terminations and the concepts related to them, 7 ' the CEO insists that the
company must do whatever is necessary to establish its right to discharge
employees for theft, even if it is a first offense and the employer has acted
leniently in the past. One practical solution in these circumstances would
appear to be the promulgation of a written policy stating that, notwithstanding
any implied or express agreements relating to employee job security, the
company reserves its right to terminate employees caught stealing, even if it is
a first offense and without regard to the manner in which the employer has
disciplined employees in the past. An astute employer may realize that the
policy statement should address other areas in which a first offense could result
in discharge and amend the statement accordingly. The employer may be even
more ambitious and decide that turning a discipline case over to an arbitrator
without any guidelines is too risky. Such an employer may expand the policy
statement to cover the issue of discipline in its entirety.
Note what has occurred in this scenario. Guided by labor arbitration
principles, the arbitrator has imposed contract obligations upon the employer.
The employer responds by essentially creating a more elaborate contract by
issuing its policy on discipline for theft (or on discipline more generally). This
fairly unremarkable hypothetical demonstrates how contractual agreements,
relatively complex and not unlike collective bargaining agreements, could arise
in the non-union employment relationship.
A real-life example confirms the possibilities suggested by the hypothetical
above. In a 1997 arbitration case, two non-union employees who had
completed a mechanic training course filed grievances because they were not
promoted to a higher-graded classification.'76 The employees claimed that on
every prior occasion, promotions followed graduation from the training
program.' In response, the company argued that its handbook did not provide
for such an automatic promotion.' The arbitrator framed the issue as follows:
This case requires the Arbitrator to determine the role of
175. For example, the requirements ofprogressive discipline and non-discriminatory
treatment.
176. See Indiana Mich. Power Co., 107 Lab. Arb.(BNA) 1037,1038 (1997) (Render,
Arb.). The employees had been laid off as a result of a restructuring by the company. Id. at 1038.
Their claims related to the severance pay they received, which would have been greater if they
had been classified at a higher grade. Id.
177. Id. at 1040.
178. Id. at 1039.
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past practice in a non-union setting where the employer has
made certain representations to its employees in an Employee
Handbook which handbook is admittedly not contractualin
nature. The real question is whether past practice or a
customary way of doing things has any role in non-union
arbitration under an employee handbook such as the one
involved in this case. There is very little 17guidance
in the
9
published arbitration decisions at this point.
In explaining his rationale for sustaining the grievances, the arbitrator
began by noting the importance of past practice in the company-union setting:
Under certain circumstances, past practice can become a
binding part of the labor agreement which can only be
changed through negotiation. A binding past practice may
work to the benefit of the company in one situation and to the
union in another. The point is that the doctrine of binding past
practice is seen as a useful concept for both companies and
unions under certain circumstances....
One of the reasons for the existence of the doctrine of
past practice, whether a given practice is binding or not, is
that it helps create a more stable working environment which
benefits the company, the union and the employees.'s
Having noted the importance of past practice in the union situation, the
arbitrator expressed his opinion that "past practice can serve the parties well
even when operating under a non contractual handbook.''. He concluded his
reasoning on this point as follows:
Simply put, the Arbitrator is at a loss to understand how the
company could treat employees fairly and equally if it did not
take into account the way that it treated other employees.
Thus, the Arbitrator concludes that the doctrine of past
practice makes sense in a non-union setting when a company
has a non contractualhandbookwhich makes pledges to the
employees." 2
One could consider this decision as the picture of things to come, a picture
worth a thousand words and more, illustrating several of the key points in this
Article. The arbitrator considered the significance of a handbook which even

179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 1041 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1042 (emphasis added).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

49

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 6
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. SO: 183

he characterized as non-contractual. Yet in the highly relational context of
employment, previously governed by norms voluntarily adhered to by the
parties, a neutral third party must determine which party is to prevail. These
norms then become the basis of contractual rights and duties, because the
analytical construct of arbitration inevitably channels the inquiry in that
direction. Moreover, despite the predictions that arbitration will not be easily
transplanted to the non-union context, the arbitrator in this case relied upon
labor arbitration conventions in his decision. Thus, the formerly invisible
individual employment contract might become visible.
V. CONCLUSION
The non-union workplace has a long tradition of self-govemance, with
most of the interactions between the parties being based more on the
employer's voluntary adherence to informal norms than on their obligatory
compliance with legal constraints. However, over the past twenty-five years,
numerous employment-related legal initiatives have resulted in the
government's assuming an increasingly significant regulatory function in the
non-union context. As statutory guarantees of employee rights proliferated and
the number of jurisdictions adopting judicially-created exceptions to the
employment-at-will rule multiplied, it became more difficult to describe
precisely governance in the non-union workplace. In a sense, the present state
of affairs suggests a bifurcated system in which employers necessarily yield to
legislative and judicial commands, where applicable, but at the same time
maintain a relatively informal (that is, "non-legal") relationship with employees
in those areas the law has yet to penetrate.
Apparently, a substantial number of employers of non-union employees are
choosing to submit employment disputes to arbitrators. This trend will lead
both to the emergence ofcontract obligations or their functional equivalent and
to the relatively informal practices of the past being supplanted by a more
formal, law-centered system of governance. The material with which to build
a contractual model is already present in the non-union employment
relationship. In this highly relational exchange, one might regard the duties of
the employer and the correlative rights of the employee as having potential
energy, stored energy not yet released.1 3 If a substantial number of employers
opt for arbitration, this will change. Although not as formalistic as litigation
before courts or administrative agencies, arbitration is an adjudicatory function
183. Employee successes based on exceptions to the employment-at-will rule have
activated some of these rights and duties. However, litigation of this type, especially when the
plaintiffprevails, tends to involve egregious or otherwise inappropriate employer behavior and
is both atypical and infrequent in a particular employment setting. Arbitration, on the other hand,
could become much more commonplace and perhaps even routine in some work environments
and, therefore, more likely to involve relatively ordinary issues relating to personnel
management. In such circumstances, the articulation of employer duties and employee rights is
more apt to invade the consciousness of the parties, making the contract a tangible reality.
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and has much in common with such processes. The requirements of procedural
fairness and a decision-making methodology designed to weigh competing
claims will inevitably lead to the articulation of rights and duties. Even firstyear law students will recognize these as constituting the essence of contract.
Some of the claims presented to employment arbitrators will be grounded on
legislation which will accentuate the need to provide procedural rights to
employees and will promote the development of rigorous legal analysis by
decision makers.
Once employers and their attorneys fully appreciate the ramifications of
these developments, prudence will dictate a conservative course of action,"5 4
which translates to a set of "minimum standards" with regard to both
procedural and substantive matters. Otherwise, the risk that an arbitrator will
impose such standards when the employer feels it can least afford them
remains. Some employers will elect to articulate these standards in a handbook
or employee manual, especially if they wish to limit the arbitrator's discretion;
other employers will simply abide by the minimum standards, which arbitrators
could easily recognize as implied contract terms unless the employment
agreement provides otherwise. 5' In either situation, a contract or its functional
equivalent will emerge and the non-union employment relationship will be
profoundly altered as a result.

184. See, e.g., Richard A. Bales, Compulsory Arbitrationof Employment Claims: A
PracticalGuide to DesigningandImplementing EnforceableAgreements, 47 BAYLOR L. REV.
591 (1995) (defining the minimum components that compulsory arbitration agreements must
possess to ensure judicial enforcement).
185. One incentive for the adoption of standard terms, or acquiescence to those
standard terms which are implied as a matter of law, is the promotion of efficiency by reducing
transaction costs. As one commentator notes, legally-implied, standard terms "establish a set of
ready-made contract terms, and whenever the parties would have included similar provisions in
their agreement, they are made better off by being spared the time and expense of having to do
so." Anthony Kronman, Paternalismand the Law of Contracts,92 YALE L. J. 763, 766 (1983).
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